With a population of 70 million, West Bengal has only 0.02 hectare of forest per capita, one of the lowest rates in Asia (
FN 18). While officially forest covers 13 percent of the total land area, only 9 percent possesses vegetative cover, and much of this is severely depleted. Of the West Bengal's nonmangrove forest, 45 percent is classified open, with a canopy closure of only 10 to 40 percent. In the western forests of the state, the native Shorea robusta (sal) stands have been subjected to intensive commercial and subsistence use pressures for more than a century. Continued clearfelling during the 1960s and 1970s, combined with extensive fuelwood cutting, reduced timber reserves to extremely low levels. By 1993, the standing stock was only 15 m3/ha versus a national average of 77m3, with highs of more than 200m3 in the mountain forests of West Bengal (FN 19).In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the political atmosphere in southwest Bengal was tense. Low-income households, especially tribals and scheduled castes, began rapidly cutting the state forests as government authority waned after the communist Naxalite uprising. Although the forest department sought police assistance to protect remaining forest stands, they were often met with forcible resistance from community groups. Violent confrontations resulted in deaths on both sides. In Purulia district the situation was particularly explosive. The region had been carved out of south Bihar in 1956 and was the poorest district in West Bengal. Poor villagers were often hired by contractors to cut fuelwood, accelerating deforestation.
In 1970, in another corner of southwest Bengal, A. K. Banedee, an Indian forest service officer, had been appointed silviculturalist for the Midnapur area. Experiments were being conducted with native sal, teak, eucalyptus, and other timber species. The trials were often disrupted by villagers cutting fuelwood and grazing their cattle on the experimental plots. The silviculturalist began meeting with members of eleven villages surrounding the Arabari forest experimentation area. The officer attempted to offer the villagers a comprehensive employment program, to absorb them in plantation work. In return he asked them to stop grazing and cutting on the field plots and in nearby forests. He explained that where there was viable rootstock, community forest protection would result in rapid regeneration of degraded natural forests at very little cost. Natural regrowth led to substantial increases in biomass productivity, enhancing the availability of fuel, fodder, fibers, and numerous non-timber forest products. Later, Banerjee agreed to provide 25 percent of the revenues from timber sales and all rights to non-timber forest products to villages participating in forest protection. In 1972, the first forest protection group recognized by the forest department was formed in West Bengal.
The effect of Banedee's achievements was limited to small forest tracts, however. Agreements with the village forest committees were informal and had little validity beyond the term of the individual forest officers. Foresters were often rotated every few years, providing little continuity for cooperative arrangements. Banerjee attempted to extend his approach, preparing a plan for the Nayagram forests in Midnapur district, but was rotated in 1974 before he could initiate a dialogue with neighboring communities.
While successful examples of joint management agreements were beginning to emerge in Arabari and a few other places in Midnapur, Bankura, and Purulia districts after 1972, throughout the decade they remained isolated cases with little impact on routine forest management systems. Nonetheless, these early experiences demonstrated that opening communications with resident forest communities could effectively reduce conflicts between the forest department and local residents. Unfortunately, lessons emerging from Arabari received little attention until the late 1980s.
By late 1970, some villages in southwest Bengal had begun taking the forest management crisis into their own hands. Facing forest product scarcities, often encouraged by local leaders, a few hamlets began taking control of small tracts of degraded forests, establishing patrols and closing them to cutting. People who were found cutting green wood or grazing animals were warned by village volunteers. Repeat offenders from participating villages were fined; outsiders were turned over to forestry field staff. Most confrontations occurred during the first and second year of forest closure, after which the restrictions and rights of the protecting communities gained greater recognition from neighbors.
As investments in social forestry grew in the 1980s, funded largely by the World Bank, the forest department's perspective focused increasingly on community collaboration. While stress was initially placed on establishing eucalyptus woodlots on village lands, the success of community forest protection groups began to be recognized. Several senior forest officers began to encourage the communist forest minister to extend formal recognition to village FPCs. The minister also received favorable reports from the party's grassroots political workers. As a consequence, a government resolution recognizing the important contributions of village FPCs was passed in 1989. Drawing on the Arabari experience, the resolution also vested them with rights to a 25-percent share of timber harvests and most non-timber forest products. The new resolution encouraged both forest department field staff and village groups to expand local forest protection efforts. As a result, the number of forest protection committees in southwest Bengal increased front a few dozen in 1985 to 1,250 in 1989, and to 1,912 in 1993 (see Table 1 ) (
FN 20).Table 1. Percentage of Total State Forest Under Community
Management for Districts in Southwest Bengal
|
District |
1985 (%) |
1989 (%) |
1993 (%) |
|
Midnapur |
2 |
40 |
72 |
|
Bankura |
1 |
35 |
51 |
|
Purulia |
1 |
39 |
65 |
|
Total Area |
5,000 |
152,000 |
254,646 |
Chandri forest is located in southwest Bengal on the border with Bihar, just 10 km south of Jhargram town. The forest is comprised of 1,500 hectares of uniform sal trees, with some mahua and other species. Until 1962, the forest was managed by a local Zamindar: Narasinghina Malodev, Raja of Jhargram. During the Raja's time, forest use was strictly controlled. Binindo Mahato, an 85-year-old tribal from Shimli village, recalls that tigers and wolves were fairly common, although the Raja leased the land for felling every ten years.
Twenty-eight communities (sahi) are located around Chandri forest. Each community has 15 to 100 households, primarily Mahato and Santhal tribal peoples, with some Lodha and Bhumij tribals as well (see Figure 4). The forest is divided to the north and south by National Highway 6.

Community forest protection activities in the area began in Shimli village. A mixed community of Mahato and Santhal tribal peoples, the hamlet has historically been closely involved with forest management under the Zamindar administration. According to Gundar Mahato, a 40-year-old leader of the village FPC, some Shimli villagers worked as the Raja's forest guards, collecting fees for fuelwood and timber cutting. Because Shimli villagers had little private rain-fed rice land, they, instead, planted millet in open patches in the forest and hunted. At that time, the community consumed many forest foods including tubers, mushrooms, mahua seeds and flowers, bhel, kendu, and piyal.
In 1962, following the Zamindari Abolition Act (1957), the West Bengal Forest Department (WBFD) acquired the Chandri tract and designated it as reserve forest. It was subsequently closed to hunting and farming. Shimli villagers resisted the new policies throughout the 1960s. In one confrontation, Mahato tribals fought with WBFD guards over forest access, and six villagers were jailed for three months (see Box 4).
|
Box 4: Chandri Beat Time Line |
|
|
Pre-1957 |
Shimli Forest (Zamindari Forest) under Naresinghila Malodev, Raja of Jhargram. Some Shimli villagers worked as the Raja's forest guards and charged cutting fees. |
|
1957 |
Zamindari Abolition Act. |
|
1962-63 |
Shimli forest transferred to state control |
|
1964-70 |
WBFD closes forest to hunting and farming. Shimli village resists; Mahatos fight with WBFD guards over forest access, and six villagers are jailed for three months. |
|
1970-1975 |
WBFD begins timber felling operations in Shimli. |
|
1973 |
Shimli villager wins felling auction and hires a few villagers to help cut timber. |
|
1977-78 |
CPIM wins election. Many communities around Shimli forest believe they now have rights to fell trees. Lodha villages begin commercial felling in forests around Shimli |
|
1979 |
Shimli villagers hold meeting and begin patrolling forests to halt felling |
|
1982-89 |
Heavy forest cutting by local communities and degradation in forests not protected by Shimli FPC |
|
1986 |
Pressures from neighboring villages increase as forest regenerates. Shimli establishes formal FPC. Frequent confrontations with Lodha communities. Shimli's authority challenged by neighboring villages. |
|
1988 |
Shimli FPC seizes axes, saws, and carts. Fights occur. |
|
1989 |
West Bengal government order for joint forest management passes. |
|
1990 |
Shimli divides protected forest with six neighboring hamlets that form FPCs. |
|
1991 |
Shimli FPC initiates mapping of forest tract and is registered by WBFD. Three villages south of highway establish FPCs. |
|
1992-93 |
Villages east of Shimli forest unable to control forest use |
|
1994 |
Meetings held with eastern villages. Two new FPCs form with protection initiated in Asanbani and Kundasol. |
|
1995 |
WBFD holds meeting with eastern communities that have not organized FPCs. |
In 1970, after some delays, the WBFD began implementing the working plan for the area, which prescribed the clearfelling of sal on a 10-year rotation, leaving only mother trees ("coppice with standards"). Timber felling operations continued in the Chandri area until the mid-1970s. Felling parcels (coups) were auctioned to local businesspeople, and in 1973 a Shimli villager acquired a lease. He hired a few neighbors to help him cut the timber. These growing economic ties to the forest may have given some members of the Shimli community an added stake in sustaining the resource.
In 1978, Community Party India Marxist (CPIM) again won the state election and many communities around Chandri forest took this as a signal that the forests would be turned over to the people, likely influenced by the earlier land reform program. It may be that some CPIM cadre had implied such a policy would be enacted if their party were victorious. A number of communities became actively involved in cutting trees in Chandri forest for commercial sale. The Lodha villages of Baghajhapa and Barapal were particularly active in commercial felling. The Chandri beat officer reported that the forests experienced severe degradation from 1978 to 1982.
Most Shimli villagers, however, did not engage in illegal felling. In 1979, seeing the rapid deforestation occurring, community leaders held meetings deciding that cutting should be forbidden in the forests neighboring Shimli. A volunteer patrol system was established. Ten to twelve young men participated under the direction of a group leader. The men patrolled the periphery of the protected area at night. During the day, any village person who went to the forest was responsible for reporting illegal cutting. If an incident occurred, other villagers were called to control the situation. Conflicts with other villages were common in the years after protection began, but the Shimli, due to its large size (100 households-75 Mahato and 25 Santhal) and its closeness to the forest, was able to resist outside pressures from individuals and small groups of fuelwood cutters. Confrontation with the neighboring Lodha villages began immediately after protection started. Gundar Mahato remembers that "The Lodhas used to come twice weekly for cutting. On Sundays they came to cut fuelwood to sell at the market (hat) on Tuesday, and again they would come on Wednesday to cut more for sale. We could find them by the sounds of their tools in the forest. Sometimes they would fight back with their axes. Once Jiwan Mahato and Punchanam Mahato were injured."
The Shimli FPC received periodic encouragement from local Forest Department Range Officer Gurai Babu, although no formal community forest protection program existed at the time. A local range officer, impressed by the dedication of the forest protection group, contributed sports equipment to the FPC in 1985 as an indication of his support.
By 1986, the sal trees near Shimli had regenerated well, reaching 10 to 15 meters in height. As the trees gained greater commercial value, these assets attracted the attention of town-based entrepreneurs who began organizing gangs to fell the trees. In 1987, a large group of Lodha tribals from Baghajhapa village entered the forest at night. Two men were caught by the Shimli patrol and taken to the forest department office. The two men, however, lodged a countercomplaint against the Shimli FPC, asking the district forest officer, "What right does Shimli have to stop us? This is the forest department's job; only they have the authority." They also threatened the Shimli villagers with physical harm if they entered the Lodha area.
To muster broader-based public support for forest protection, Shimli leaders organized a series of meetings with a number of neighboring communities, telling them they could share rights to the collection of non-timber products. They also encouraged other villages to form their own FPCs. Most villages were not yet able to agree to close the forest to felling. Many were skeptical that the government and more powerful interest groups would allow them to benefit from protection. However, Baksol and Purnapani villages, which had strong kinship ties to Shimli families through marriage, began organizing protection activities.
An organized gang from Jhargram town began a major felling operation in the Shimli area in 1989. The group had trucks and arms, so the community did not confront them immediately. They developed a plan to trap the loggers at night by barricading the road. On an agreed- upon signal, more than thirty tribals, armed with bows and arrows, spears, and axes, came out of the forest. The loggers fled, but several truck drivers were apprehended and turned over to the forest department. The department offered the Shimli FPC a reward; however, the village leaders rejected the money, saying that was not the purpose of their protection activities.
In 1989, the West Bengal government issued a resolution legitimizing joint forest management. Forest department field staff began holding meetings with communities, encouraging them to follow Shimli's example. Between 1990 and 199 1, twelve communities west of Chandri forest patch formed FPCs. The Shimli FPC agreed to subdivide its protected forest with four neighboring communities (Madhupur, Jaruliya, Auligeria, and Baksol). The eight other villages began protecting degraded forest tracts near them.
To better establish its forest rights, in 1990 Shimli village decided to demarcate the community's protected forest. While Shimli had allowed members of neighboring communities to collect non-timber forest products, tree cutting was forbidden. After the West Bengal government order was passed in 1989, Jaruliya, Auligeria, Madhupur, and Baksol formed independent FPCs and began questioning the authority of Shimli to control so much of the local forestlands. Shimli villagers realized that they could not continue to assume responsibility for all forestlands to the north of National Highway 6. Meetings were held with ten representatives from each of the FPCs of the neighboring villages northwest of the forest, and an agreement was made to divide the Shimli protected area with neighboring communities. The FPC executive committee also invited the local revenue (mouza) officer and forest department range officer to assist with the demarcation. Natural land features, as well as roads, were used for boundary identification. Maps were made for the FPC and the beat and range officers. A signature book of all Shimli community members was also prepared.
Purnapani and Baksol villages, situated along National Highway 6, formed an FPC in 1990. Despite their vulnerable location of the forest because of its road access, the community has successfully controlled illegal felling. Eight other communities south of the highway have also succeeded in protecting the forest with impressive regeneration. The southern villages, however, had a series of conflicts with headloaders from Parshana, Sonakera, and Phutipal hamlets across the Dulung Nada River. Apparently, villagers had been paid in advance by a middleman to supply him with fuelwood. Once their efforts had failed, due to protecting forest communities, the entrepreneur stopped financing their activities. Ultimately, the six hamlets found they could succeed in controlling the pressures from across the river by coordinating their protection systems.
Villages east of the forest have had more difficulties protecting their areas (
see Figure 4). Since 1991, the forest department has held regular meetings with these hamlets, but little progress was made in establishing effective access controls. In 1994, however, the Mahato communities of Kundasol, Asanbani, and Kashitariya were able to activate their FPCS, and extensive sat regeneration became apparent in their areas.The two Lodha communities of Baghajhapa and Barapal apparently still require income from commercial fuelwood headloading, and have found no alternative that would allow them to close nearby forests to cutting. The four other hamlets to the immediate north and south of Highway 6 are near the small town of Aquibani. Commercial headloaders from the town put additional headloading pressure on these areas. The four small communities may not have sufficient villagers to deter outside users from the town. Gram panchayat member Ardhendu Shekhar Giri, a Brahman from Aquibani, says, "We have told them they can get a 25-percent share of the forests, but when we catch them, they only say they will not cut the forests again, but then they do."
Since 1991, forest department encouragement of FPC actions, with panchayat support, has increased. Regular meetings are organized for FPC groups around Chandri forest. It seems likely that over the next few years the remaining communities will also establish effective protection groups. Shimli FPC is currently thinking beyond protection toward forest management options. Already the FPC has allocated rights to 400 mahua trees in its area to the 100 village households. This privatization of more valuable resource usufructs indicates a move toward more intensive management. Shimli leaders suggest that more mahua trees could be planted in gaps in their 250-hectare forest tract. Currently, the forest is well stocked with an average of 1,200 sat trees per hectare, generally ten to fifteen years old. The IFPC leaders believe that trees could be cut on a 10-year rotation, 25 hectares per year. They feel that it would be difficult to selectively fell them, since this would leave stumps in the forest and members would not be able to differentiate the legitimate from the illegal feelings.
Shimli is also interested in intensifying the production and marketing of mushrooms. Virtually all households collect mushrooms, although two individuals have been selected for marketing them. They also feel there is some potential to better market their sat leaves, which are used for leaf plate-making.
Communities surrounding Chandri forest are increasingly concerned about a herd of elephants that migrate into the area and take shelter in the regenerating woods. They are reluctant to cross the forest at night for fear they may encounter the herd. No clear ideas have emerged regarding ways to co-exist with the animals.
The evolution of protection activities around Chandri forest is characteristic of changes occurring in forest management in southwest Bengal. Rapid deforestation proceeded throughout the 1960s and 1970s, driven by industrial exploitation, demographic growth, and political change. Concern over resource depletion led a single village to begin protecting part of Chandri forest in the late 1970s. Over the next fifteen years, more than twenty communities joined Shimli villagers in an attempt to impose effective access controls and stem the process of deforestation around this 1,500-hectare patch.
Forest closure has resulted in displacement of some low-income, tribal fuelwood collectors who continue to pursue their trade in a social environment that reflects the growing conservation sentiments of neighboring communities. While some forest department staff have attempted to encourage community forest protection efforts, the capacity to facilitate a smooth management transition appears limited. The forest department has had little success responding to the needs of communities of landless families who depend on fuelwood gathering, particularly women.
The Shimli village case also exemplifies a gradual transition from initial access closure and strict protection toward productive management. With nearly 2.5 hectares of productive forest per household, Shimli's forest represents an important economic resource. Past management had dictated a 10-year clearfelling cycle, which was designed to meet industrial objectives rather than those of the village. Now that the forest has come under village management, new production objectives are being discussed, reflecting the multiple needs of the community. Unfortunately, the forest department has little research or practical experience with techniques to manipulate these sal forest ecosystems for multiple products. Currently, Shimli forests remain slated for clearfelling under the working plan. While some Shimli villagers are attracted by the 25-percent share they may receive from timber harvest, some have alternatively proposed enrichment planting of indigenous fruit trees and mushrooms within the forest for household management. New methods for production-objective setting and management planning to bring foresters and villagers together are urgently needed throughout southwest Bengal, as communities move from protection to sustainable production.
Due to its political history, the West Bengal Forest Department has had a greater involvement in the evolution of community forest protection than the neighboring states of Bihar and Orissa. The state's communist government, by encouraging land reform, decentralized governance systems, and other participatory programs, has created an environment where communities perceive a growing right to manage local natural resources. The West Bengal Forest Department has attempted to change with these evolving policies, but still faces the challenges of forestry professionals in neighboring states. The new roles for foresters remain vaguely defined, and traditional ways of managing forests tend to dominate.