PART 2

DEVOLVING FOREST CONTROL IN EASTERN INDIA

While forest department officers have played an influential role in devolving forest protection responsibilities to community groups, the extraordinary increase in the number of FPCs indicates a receptive social climate was already present long before initiation of formal JFM programs. Land reform programs of the 1970s, as well as political organizers, gave rural communities a new perception of their resource rights in a changing policy environment. This, combined with the accelerating degradation of the forest environment and consequent product scarcities, generated increasing concern and discussion in rural southwest Bengal. One outcome was the growing attempts by low socioeconomic status groups to gain greater control over local forests. As some villages demonstrated that they could effectively protect neighboring forests, other communities followed, generating an accelerating spread of community-controlled forests throughout the region. The cases in this report not only illustrate the diffusion of local management innovations, but also the need for effective working relationships between government officials and among local communities.

Despite the growing body of information on India's grassroots forest protection movement, much of this data is anecdotal and scattered. This report provides a detailed documentation of the history of forest protection in its center of origin. The in-depth studies describe the spread of JFM in three key eastern Indian states, illustrating changes in forest use practices among local communities in recent decades (see Figure 2). The cases from Orissa, West Bengal, and Bihar examine clusters of hamlets surrounding forest patches or large forest tracts. The history of use, conflict, and compromise illustrates how community concerns, local politics, and government policies and programs combine to create an environment where forest resource use begins to stabilize.

Figure 2. Map of eastern India study areas

Kudada, in south Bihar, provides an excellent example of cooperation among thirty-two forest villages living on the periphery of the forest. Over the past twenty years, without the assistance of the forest department or other outside organizations, community leaders have organized a coordinating body that oversees protection. The leaders are now exploring ways to bring the ecosystem into productive use.

In West Bengal, Chandri forest illustrates the evolution of forest closure systems initiated by a single village -- a system now spreading to many local tribal communities. The struggle to include settlements of "criminal tribes" in protection continues, while alternatives to commercial fuelwood collection are found to supplement their income.

Case studies from Orissa are drawn from Sarangi range. Forest protection around small, medium, and large forest patches are examined. Kaimati villagers have managed a small hill forest for nearly twenty-five years for timber and non-timber products, revenues from which fund a variety of community projects. Around Rupabalia hill, over the past two decades ten villagers have gradually joined in a cooperative effort to restore the once-degraded forest. Finally, in the large Kapilas forest, enclave villages successfully stemmed illegal logging operations to stablilize forest use along a road that passes through the reserve.

Each case illuminates the struggles thousands of villages in India are experiencing, both with their own membership and with their neighbors, as they attempt to establish sustainable forest management systems for resources critical to their survival. The social and political complexity reflected in each case exemplifies the difficult environments in which management transitions are unfolding. Consequently, the findings presented here are preliminary, as the transitions in forest management are still under way. The cases may be read selectively, illuminating broader trends discussed in the introduction and emerging management lessons presented in the conclusion. The lessons in social process emerging from the cases may have relevance in many parts of India and beyond.

Community Forest Protection in Bihar

At the same time, the Bihar Forest Department has been actively engaged through the 1980s in extending a social forestry program with bilateral funding from the Swedish International Development Authority. Like similar programs in other states, the establishment of nurseries and fast-growing tree plantations was encouraged under the initiative. While strategies to form village forest committees (VFCs) and to develop joint management plans for community woodlots were a component of the program, these activities remained separate and isolated from the indigenous natural forest protection initiatives, which were expanding throughout the southern part of the state.

Some communities decided to exploit their regenerating forests, reflecting severe economic conditions where fuelwood sales were essential for survival. In other cases, neighboring villages initiated mass looting of a community protected forest. Yet, despite their collapse, often within a year or two of the felling, many villages attempted to reestablish their forest management systems. This experience suggests that indigenous community forest management groups in south Bihar are fragile and vulnerable to collapse, and may benefit from outside support to enhance their legitimacy and provide economic assistance during severe hardship.

In recent years, some foresters in the Bihar Forest Department have begun seeking new ways to encourage village forest protection groups. In 1990, the state passed a resolution authorizing the organization of village forest management and protection societies. Since 1993, the forest department has taken more active measures to implement the government order. The guidelines for community forest protection are very specific regarding organizational structure and function, with limited flexibility to incorporate the diverse range of local organizations being formed informally to stabilize forest use. For example, Resolution No. 5244 of 11 August 1990 states that:

In many cases, since grassroots FPCs operate at the hamlet level, it is impractical to involve the panchayat headman (sarpanch) who may politicize the management group. Further, there is no need to limit women's participation on the committee. Many indigenous FPCs have not even formed formal managing committees for decision making, but rather do so through the entire community.

The Bihar resolution also requires income from forest produce to be sold by the managing committee at market prices to the community. This can be unfair to the lowest income families in the community who are more forest dependent and contribute to protection, yet have limited cash available for purchasing forest commodities. Ultimately, the resolution's rigidity and lack of fit with local management systems undermine the contribution of this legitimizing order. Indigenous groups may face a dilemma in that they must either (1) continue to function in existing ways and thereby fail to gain government recognition or (2) change and conform to the resolution guidelines, which may undermine the group's effectiveness and even lead to the collapse of the community's informal forest protection organization.

While many management issues confront joint forest management in Bihar, as in other states, it is important to note the rapid spread of local forest protection groups in the southern part of the state. The case of the Kudada hills dramatically illustrates the types of local initiatives communities have taken over the past twenty years to restore degraded forestlands, and how successfully a few villages led other hamlets to join until entire hill tracts fell under community control. Kudada is also instructive in suggesting the directions village institutions may evolve, creating a multicommunity coordinating body to deal with powerful outside interests.

The Case of the Kudada Hills: Emerging FPC Apex Organizations,

In the late 1960s, the once-forested hills of Kudada, south Bihar, were covered with stones and scrub. During the monsoon, new shoots would sprout, but villagers would hack them for sale as firewood as soon as they emerged. In the early 1970s, the wood markets of Jamshedpur, 10 km to the north, would absorb any fuel the communities could find for Rs 2 to Rs 3 per 30 kg headload. Most villagers were actively involved in commercial fuelwood cutting. The main forest reserve, a 2,000-hectare hill surrounded by thirty-two villages, was badly degraded (see Figure 3). Any coppice or seedling growth in the lower slope sal forests or mixed forests of the upper slopes and ridge tops was quickly suppressed through hacking and grazing. Villagers became increasingly concerned over environmental changes and the dwindling supply of important forest products.

Figure 3. Map of Kudada hill forests and neighboring villages

This case examines the process of forest management change in four stages: (1) the awareness among a few village leaders, (2) the mobilization of community opinion to take forest management protection action, (3) the process of FPC formation spreading to other communities in the area, and finally (4) the emergence of an apex coordinating organization.

Stage 1 -- Early Environmental Concerns As early as 1970, some villagers began voicing concerns over the growing degradation of local forests. The nature of their anxieties were both economic and environmental. Tribal communities, heavily dependent on forest resources for housing, agricultural tools, medicines, food, fuel, and fodder, recognized that depletion of the resources threatened their own livelihoods. Ecological changes also implied an altered microclimate, depleted water resources, and a generally less hospitable living environment. Village leaders came from the tribal elders and from the younger, socially active community members. Often a series of meetings were held in one or two local hamlets to discuss the problem and possible courses of action. Over several years, a consensus emerged supporting closure of forest hillsides to allow regeneration.

Suren Singh Sardar, an 80-year-old tribal, noted that some initial attempts of the Balidih village, one of the first to discuss forest protection, began in the early 1960s, but eventually collapsed. By 1968, the forest was in extremely bad condition. Most standing trees had been felled and roots extracted for fuelwood, exposing a stony ground cover. In 1972, a meeting was called involving three neighboring hamlets (tola) (Dungi, Bhumij, and Mazhi). According to those present:

While the economic importance of the forest to tribal villages is compelling and is an often-cited reason for protection, local people often assess environmental impact in other ways. In the nearby cluster of villages to the north, villagers were also concerned about forest destruction by the late 1960s. Nunaram Mardi, of Bhitar Dari village, was one of the early leaders in his area of the forest protection movement. Mardi is a traditional medicine practitioner, writer, and poet who spends time collecting herbs in the forest and walking to distant villages to provide them with his services. He explains why he began encouraging his neighbors to protect the forest:

Another villager simply noted that "We are adivasi (tribals). We are totally dependent on the forest. Destroying the forest means the destruction of adivasi culture; that's why we protect the forest."

Community elders also played a supportive role in the formation of FPCs. One older tribal noted that village elders encouraged protection activities by saying, "We may not live long; the forest is yours so you have to protect. Moreover, the trees are growing up now and at this stage it needs protection; otherwise the forest will be destroyed again."

Stage 2 - The Process of Community Organizing and Establishing Forest Protection Systems. Regenerating the natural forest required village leaders to mobilize enough support within their own and neighboring communities to effectively close the area to use. Forest closure presented considerable hardships for economically marginal people who found it difficult to accept.

The process of organizing community forest protection was not without conflict. In 1976, in the initiating cluster of communities in Bhitar Dari, forty women from distant Tirildih village entered the forest near Bhitar Dari. Local villagers confiscated their fuelwood headloads. Village forest protection members from Turamdih, Hakegora, Bisrampur, Bahar Dari, and Bhitar Dari went to the offenders' village of Tirildih to stress the importance of forest protection and resolve the conflict that had led to the mass theft. The Tirildih people felt isolated against their neighbors' united position. A second conflict with a large group of women headloaders from a neighboring village occurred in 1978. At that time, forty saplings were cut down. A meeting was called with political representatives who were invited to help mediate, and the disagreement was resolved.

Throughout the history of Kudada's forest protection movement, the communities received little support from the Bihar Forest Department in organizing or resolving conflicts. Dispute resolution was done through intervillage meetings. Both informal leaders, as well as local panchayat representatives, played a role in mediating conflicts. The growing participation and formation of forest protection groups over time gradually established a consensus that the hill forests were closed to cutting. Many of the communities that initially attempted to exploit the newly protected forests later formed their own management groups.

Stage 3 - The Spread of Forest Protection Groups For forest protection activities to be effective, village leaders reported that they needed to gain support not only from their own community, but also from neighboring communities. Since the small hillside forests were effectively open access resources, villagers from surrounding communities shared them. Without an agreement from their neighbors, any unilateral attempts to impose access controls and a moratorium on cutting and grazing would have been futile. Consequently, village leaders visited neighboring communities during the early stages of their organization and discussed the benefits of forest protection.

Devandra Naik, Nunaram Murmu, and other Ho, Santhal, and Kol tribal people have restored Kudada forest. Villagers from Talsa and Turamdih began protecting the forests in the northeastern side of Kudada hill track in 1978. At that time the hill was covered with grass and stone; today it is a multi storied forest.

Foresters, university researchers, and NGO staff work collaboratively with community members to document the history of forest protection. Sketch maps proved effective in identifying spatial interactions, use domains, and areas of conflict.

A forest protection committee leader neighboring Shimli village proudly displays the certificate of registration that provides his village with rights and responsibilities for 50 hectares of state forest land.

Southeast of Kudada hill, Bhitar Dari village leaders brought the five neighboring hamlets together to discuss forest protection needs, before a consensus was reached among the communities to close access to Dulthi and Marang Butu hills. Bhitar Dari leaders note that the success of their efforts over the past twenty years was based on the joint commitment to forest protection.

Still, some villages failed to cooperate: "Our village is located near the forest and the township. There is a good market for fuelwood, and the villagers are very poor. They were used to entering the forest to cut trees, so we faced a lot of troubles at the time. So we went to every household in the offending communities and motivated them by showing the example of Talsa conunittee, which was running very well under the leadership of Bhagmat Tudu." By 1995, fuelwood prices in Jamshedpur market had reached an attractive high of Rs 40 per headload, but virtually no household in the area was engaged in the activity since the closure of the forest.

Stage 4 -- The Emergence of an Apex Coordinating Committee In 1979, a meeting of all thirty-two villages in the area was called in Kudada to reach an agreement regarding the protection of the hill forests. The gathering was a turning point. The ten communities already engaged in forest protection convinced the other twenty-two to initiate active protection activities. An agreement was also reached to form an Apex Committee called the Adargha Gram Vikash Samithi. Besides encouragement from hamlet leaders, the support of Panchayat Pradhan (headman) K. K. Murmu was instrumental in reaching the agreement.

The Apex Committee is comprised of representatives from the thirty-two communities participating in forest protection. Now that local community support for forest protection is strong, the committee feels its primary goal is to protect the local forests from outside threats. A number of private firms are attempting to get mining rights to the hill tracks from the government. Indeed, experience with the Uranium Company of India, Ltd. (UCIL), dramatically demonstrated the dangers of outside exploitation. In 1984, UCIL succeeded in securing rights to the Nandup hill, forcing a resettlement of the village that resulted in deforestation of the hill.

In January 1995, at a meeting of the Apex Committee, the leadership noted that the biggest threat facing the thirty-two villages of Kudada was of a political nature. Entrepreneurs from Jamshedpur continue to seek ways to exploit the forests and mineral resources of the area. Matteson Sardar, the committee chairperson, concludes, "We need a strong committee; we need to register as a formal entity and find ways to generate income for our communities.... We are concerned the forest department will attempt to fell our forests, but with our committee we may be able to resist these threats."

While the committee currently rejects felling the young secondary forests or even thinning them to generate revenues, they are interested in exploring ways to enhance its productivity. As the sal trees reach fifteen to twenty years of age, they begin producing oil-bearing seeds. With nearly 2,000 hectares of forest, collection and processing of oil seeds could provide the protection groups with substantial revenues. Yet, capitalization, technology, and market information is not easily available to the committee. Whether the forest protection groups of Kudada can move from forest protection to productive management remains to be determined.

The Role of the Forest Department Interactions between Kudada's FPCs and the Bihar Forest Department have been sporadic and both positive and negative. When Kudada leaders began initiating forest protection groups, the forest department had no policy or program to support such activities. In some cases, supportive guards and beat officers provided ideas and motivation; in other areas, field staff viewed village efforts as an encroachment on the forest department's authority. Churnaram Mahot, an 80-year-old tribal from Bahar Dari village, said,

Another village leader, however, noted that he had little assistance from the forest department staff in organizing his community: "The forest guard allowed women to cut dry branches of the trees as fuelwood in exchange for rice and other things."

Conflicts with the forest department also occurred over plantations being established in the area. Community members generally disapproved of the species, particularly eucalyptus, being planted. One man noted, "Eucalyptus is not a good tree; even the bird will not build a nest in it." Some young eucalyptus plantations were cut down by villagers, more as a protest than for the fuelwood. After this occurred, the forest department ceased planting activities in the area.

In recent years, since the approval of community forest protection by the state government, a local divisional forest officer began meeting regularly with the Kudada Apex Committee. Village leaders were impressed by his sincere interest in assisting them. He carefully noted their needs for equipment to improve protection activities and promised to supply them with flashlights, a vehicle, and other goods. Later he was transferred, and none of the promised equipment was given. At the time of this study, the villagers had few expectations regarding assistance from the forest department. Their greater concern was that the forest department might sell logging rights to Kudada to an outside contractor, betraying their efforts of nearly twenty years.

Summary

The Kudada experience reflects the successful ways in which Bihar communities have cooperated to restore substantial tracts of once-degraded natural forests. The threat of outside exploitation of local resources has encouraged villages to establish common management objectives and organize a coordinating institution to strengthen their position. The lack of field support from the Bihar Forest Department is striking, considering the agency has a heavy investment in social forestry programs and a state policy supporting community forest protection. While some divisional forest officers and forest department field staff have attempted to make contact and develop cooperative efforts with Kudada's FPCs, the lack of forest department institutional support to create long-term collaborative management systems has not allowed these well-intentioned efforts to be sustained long enough to evolve real management partnerships.

Due to the institutional development of Kudada's apex organization, its strong leadership, and the broad acceptance of a shared set of management goals by participating communities, this area provides an ideal opportunity for the Bihar Forest Department to establish a joint management partnership. In the future, community-forest department working relationships may be often coordinated through apex bodies like Kudada's. The management transition taking place in Kudada and elsewhere in Bihar requires the forest department to acknowledge that the communities are in control of these forests and that the department's role will be primarily supportive. In the future, the forest department may increasingly be a service provider in the areas of management institution development, technology, and marketing. The shift implies spending less time on custodial protection and industrial timber production and more on community extension, applied research, and training.

In recent years the Bihar Forest Department has begun registering community forest protection groups. NGOs have been contracted to carry out staff training programs in participatory forest management. Such activities are important and deserve accelerated integration and emphasis in territorial operations. Divisional forest officers need encouragement to work with their range staff to systematically map all FPCs in their areas. Regular meetings need to be conducted with FPCs to begin building relationships and developing specific programs for cooperative management. Even in Kudada, where villagers are suspicious of some forest department officers, community members acknowledge that it would be very helpful to discuss resource use options and appropriate technologies for producing, processing, and marketing non-timber forest products. That the Bihar Forest Department has not responded more effectively to support Kudada's remarkable effort to stabilize its forest resources reflects the constraints within that bureaucracy as well as the need for leadership that can assist the organization respond to the challenges of the twenty-first century.