The right to allocate state forest resources, often representing 50 to 80 percent of a nation's land area, gave government officials tremendous power. Today, as Box 2 indicates, national governments legally claim much of the land area of Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, as official state forest domain, even though less than half actually possesses significant forest cover. This discrepancy reflects both the failure of state forest management to maintain natural forest cover, as well as the reluctance of political leaders to release deforested lands from state control. While governments empower forestry departments with the legal authority to act as public land managers, political leaders usually end up making critical policy decisions regarding forest resource allocation (Note 1). In other words, most forest departments are limited to implementing forest policies, rather than making them.

By the 1980s, growing concern over deforestation in the region led many government planners and development agency experts to reconsider the wisdom of industrial forestry and the capacity of state agencies to sustain natural forests. The new school of resource economics was also proving that the social and environmental costs, both direct and indirect, of logging and mining were high and that natural resource extraction was an expensive proposition for the larger society. Bilateral and multilateral development banks began encouraging governments to explore alternative forestry sector strategies that were more responsive to rural people. The World Bank, FAO, and other organizations began promoting community forestry as a new model of development assistance, though fundamental issues of forestland rights were rarely directly addressed and project emphasis continued to be placed on capital and technical investments (Note 2).

Cambodia is situated in the heart of mainland Southeast Asia, bordered by Vietnam and Thailand, with Laos to the northeast. Ninety percent of the population is Khmer. The fertile plains of the Mekong River, the productive fisheries of Tonle Sap Lake, and the rich forests of northwest and southeast Cambodia have supported great kingdoms over the centuries (Note 3). The central lowland forests were cleared, with extensive irrigation systems built, during the Khmer Empire of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. After the fall of the Angkor Empire in the fifteenth century, Cambodia remained isolated until colonized by the French during the nineteenth century. As in Laos and Vietnam, French rulers took control of the more accessible forests, some of which were planted with rubber and other estate crops. Most of the country's upland watersheds remained isolated, however, inhabited only by ethnic minorities practicing long rotation agriculture.

From 1969 to 1997, it is estimated that 2.6 million hectares of Cambodia's forests were felled, with forest cover declining from 73 percent to between 35 and 58 percent of the land area, depending on the criteria used (Note 4). A 1986 World Conservation Union (IUCN) report estimated that as little as 10 percent of the country was primary forest. (Note 5) In the past, forest loss in Cambodia was largely attributed to local farmers opening chamkar (swidden) fields to plant rainfed rice, bananas, and other crops. From 1960, 2.5 percent of all forests were cleared each year for agricultural land. Under these long rotation- farming systems, lands are left fallow after a short period of use and most forest regenerates rapidly. Recent studies of aerial and satellite images indicate that forests in areas where chamkar is practiced have a dynamic or shifting forest cover, but that the total area under forest remains quite stable (see Box 4). (Note 6)

The unregulated logging and transport of high volumes of logs across the Thai and Vietnamese borders was made public after Global Witness began publishing a series of reports on illicit logging activities within Cambodia. During the 1997-98 dry season, it is estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 cubic meters of logs were exported from Ratanakiri province to Vietnam, while on the other side of the country, in Battambang province, 125,000 cubic meters went across the border to Thailand (Note 7). Nationwide, it is estimated that some 4 million cubic meters of timber are being exported from the country, at least four times the estimated sustainable harvest. A World Bank report concludes that 94 percent of timber exports are the result of illicit felling and transport, failure to pay government fees, or other illegal practices.

In Cambodia, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, forest-dependent communities increasingly compete with transnational corporations for access to natural resources. From 1993 to 1997, the 7 million hectares of land turned over to logging concessions produced four million cubic meters of logs. While communities are estimated to clear 70,000 hectares of forest each year for fanning, much of this is shrub land rather than forest (Note 8). Nearly 40 percent of Cambodia's total land area has been allocated to large timber concessions, many of them joint ventures between local elite's and foreign corporations. The military remain in control of many of the logging operations under way in Cambodia.

According to a recent Global Witness report, "the military are at the core of the logging problem and have to be removed from the forest equation." (Note 9) Thousands of communities located within the concession areas hold usufruct rights to the land under customary laws and are heavily dependent on it for their cash income and subsistence needs (see Ya Poey case study in Part V). Forty percent of Cambodians live in absolute poverty and much of their income is derived from common-property resources like forests and fisheries. Government policies that allocate large parts of the resource base to foreign commercial interests directly cut into the income available for a large segment of the population.

Cambodian forests are extremely important to both rural and urban communities. Recent surveys indicate that 98 percent of villagers and 85 percent of Phnom Penh residents rely on wood and charcoal as a primary source of fuel, consuming six million cubic meters of wood annually. (Note 10) The lowland flood forests along the Mekong and the periphery of Tongle Sap Lake provide the habitat for Cambodian fisheries which supply a protein-rich diet and livelihood for 40 to 60 percent of all families. Upper watershed forests enhance regular water flow for the lowland agricultural plains and urban centers. In addition, forests provide materials for housing and tools, and supply a wide variety of foods and medicines. Resins, gums, oils, fruits, birds' nests, aromatic wood, and other marketable products are all collected in natural forests. Forests are also an integral component of village hydrology and many rural farming systems, both sedentary and rotational. Consequently, villagers are concerned when national planners begin to turn over communal forest resources to outside interests.

In the case of the Mieng Ly Heng concessions, the company completely closed the forest, even banning villagers from collecting non-timber forest products. The harvesting operations included cutting big trees, such as gum and resin species, important as a source of local income. "The people were very angry with the company, but didn't know what to do because the company was threatening them. Even land in the perimeter of the Baac San Karma pagoda had been bulldozed and used as a log dump." (Note 11) In subsequent months, the community expressed their discontent by burning a number of company trucks. In another village in Kampong Thom province, villagers were upset that the Lan Song Company had begun logging operations in the forest near their settlement.

Since the mid-1990s, the World Bank has supported a national forest policy reform project in Cambodia. According to a recent report commissioned by the World Bank project analysts concluded that, "the current forest law is complex, inconsistent, and unenforceable. An unclear legal framework has made enforcement by forestry and other officials difficult, if not impossible. (Note 13) Forest concessions are allocated without a transparent process, with an absence of competitive procedures, and with no standards for management or enforcement. A new forest law has been proposed to replace earlier forest legislation. As part of the World Bank/FAO/UNDP sector strategy in Cambodia, a review of forest policy is currently under way. The existing Cambodian Forest Law grants all forestland to the state. Including degraded lands, this covers nearly 80 percent of the country.

Two national agencies, the Department of Nature Protection and Conservation and the Department of Forestry and Wildlife, both established community forestry units (CFUs) in 1998. While a national community forest management policy has yet to emerge, a multi-agency working group is lobbying effectively to bring greater attention to the need to empower villages as stewards of local forests. While Cambodian conservation and forestry agencies have limited experience in designing and implementing community forestry programs, staff training programs are already under way with support from international agencies and the NGO community. (Note 14) The Regional Community Forestry Training Center (RECOFTC), based in Bangkok, has played an important role in strengthening in-country capacity to engage forest-dependent groups.

Despite efforts by local communities and development agencies to encourage community forestry, Cambodian government policies currently allow widespread commercial exploitation of the nation's natural forests. In early 1999, in an effort to slow commercial logging and meet World Bank loan requirements to reduce concessions to 4 million hectares, the Cambodian government canceled 11 logging contracts covering 2 million hectares (Note 15). The council of Ministers created a national committee to monitor unregulated logging and authorities have tom down 300 unlicensed sawmills and seized equipment. While these steps are encouraging, environmental groups monitoring the Cambodian situation fear that the government may be taking action largely to appease international lending agencies. Global Witness warned that the country's military is positioned to resume illegal logging once critical loans are approved. There is also concern that attacks on small-scale sawmill operators will disrupt local wood supplies, causing hardships for rural populations, while "major perpetrators of illegal logging" will go unpunished. (Note 16)

Cambodian government efforts to establish a network of protected areas, while well intentioned, have also created tensions in areas where villages have not been informed or involved in planning discussions. Global Witness reports that military-controlled logging operations are ongoing in Bokor and Aural protected areas. (Note 17) The absence of forest rights and responsibilities leaves the community with no authority to protect local forests. A comprehensive policy framework is badly needed to clarify tenure rights and responsibilities over Cambodia's forests.

Indonesia is an immense archipelago extending over 4,500 kilometers from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. With some 13,000 islands, the nation possesses the world's largest expanse of tropical rain forests, except for Brazil. Approximately two-thirds of the country's population lives on the densely populated island of Java, while the remaining inhabitants are scattered throughout the "Outer Islands" which are characterized by low population densities. Aside from the dominant Javanese population, the peoples of Indonesia present a rich cultural mosaic. One ethnic survey categorized the country into 90 specific ethnic communities (Note 18) though some linguists estimate that there maybe up to 500 separate linguistic communities in Irian Jaya alone. (Note 19) Many of these cultural communities have rich traditions of resource management that they have developed over the centuries, in part in response to the unique environments that they inhabit.

The accelerated destruction of Indonesia's vast forests has created growing national and international concern. (Note 20) Prior to the colonial era, forests covered approximately 90 percent of the land area. Indonesia's forests now cover less than one-half of the country. With deforestation exceeding 1 million hectares yearly, the remaining 90 to 100 million hectares of forest are being destroyed rapidly, resulting in the loss of habitat and economic support for an estimated 30 to 80 million Indonesians.

While the MOF has limited staff presence in the field, it holds the authority to grant immense concessions to timber companies, often influenced by powerful political and private sector interests. During the New Order Government (1965-1997), 65 million hectares of forestland were leased to logging companies, representing approximately 55 percent of its forestlands, and over one-third of the national land area. The absence of a legal framework protecting the rights of forest-dependent communities, combined with the rapacious appetite of the global markets and wealthy entrepreneurs, has led to heavy logging, especially in Kalimantan and Sumatra. In late 1994, the Minister of Forests conceded that "the forestry business community still tends to perceive the country's forests as merely something to exploit. " (Note 21)

By 1995, the World Bank began to realize that industrial forestry as practiced in Indonesia had greater costs than benefits for the country as a whole. A forestry sector review paper published that year noted that even with very conservative valuations, the monetary cost of existing logging practices and market policies was at least $6 billion annually. (Note 22) The paper, among other things, recommended the "adoption of necessary legislative and regulatory instruments to encourage community participation in forest management and protection." (Note 23)

While the recent decline in timber and plywood prices tied to the Asian recession has temporarily reduced interest in Indonesian wood industries, forest conversion to palm oil and other estate crops has increased commercial pressures on Indonesia's natural forests. A recent report by the Center for International Forestry Research (CEFOR) noted that "palm oil is potentially the most important commodity in terms of impact on forest cover." (Note 24) By 1997, 2.5 million hectares of forest had been converted to palm oil crops with another 1.5 million projected for 1998. With strong global palm oil, cocoa, coffee, cloves, and rubber markets, as well as a collapse in international timber and plywood prices, there is growing pressure to convert forests to plantation crops. Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is opposed to land conversion in principle, it has been widely accused of facilitating deforestation by requiring the Indonesian government to remove all restrictions affecting foreign investment in palm oil plantation expansion under point 39 of the $43 billion dollar IMF bailout package. (Note 25)

An underlying goal of much of the reform movement in Indonesia is to disentangle the interwoven political and economic relationships that control the forestry sector. (Note 26) New policies demand that concessions obtained through collusion, corruption, and nepotism be revoked and that the maximum concession size be reduced from millions of hectares to 39,000 hectares, with no new forestlands granted for logging. The government has promised to investigate misappropriation of the reforestation fund, hundreds of millions of dollars of which were transferred to friends and relatives, while only 10 percent is estimated to have been used for reforestation (Note 27).

While the Ministry of Forests and Plantation Crops explores ways to respond to the needs of forest-dependent peoples and eliminate the crony capitalism that has characterized past forest management practices, Indonesian government leaders are under immense pressure to attract foreign investment. William Sundarlin, a forest policy analyst with CIFOR, notes that "the principal threats to the forest and forest-dwelling people are coming from outside the forest sector proper, so forest policy reform alone may not adequately address the challenge" (Note 28). Indonesian planners are caught between the need to generate foreign exchange to service huge loans by attracting outside investors with guarantees of low-cost resource access and the need to respond to the long-neglected rights of forest-dependent peoples by acknowledging their claims to public forestlands. In many areas these strategies are at odds.

In the Outer Islands, government forestlands cover 90 percent of the territory; consequently, millions of dependent families are extremely vulnerable to physical and economic dislocation by logging, mining, and estate crop concessions. (Note 29) The Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops recently noted that the members of the Suharto family still control 4.5 million hectares of forest and plantation land under long-term concessions. (Note 30) The question Indonesia's leaders now face is whether they possess the political commitment, given prevailing economic conditions, to formally recognize the forest and land tenure rights of the nation's rural people's through comprehensive new laws and programs.

Indonesia's forests are also threatened as old systems of political control lose authority and are replaced by new leaders and power centers. Without a new framework to replace the one imposed by the New Order and with a lack of law enforcement, increasing encroachment into national parks and accelerated illegal logging may be the result. A recent CIFOR study concludes that analysts may have underestimated the effects of the current power vacuum on illegal forest exploitation. (Note 31) Peluso's study of forest management in Java found that during times of political instability forests suffered greater damage from illegal logging, encroachment, and fires, often by forest-dependent peoples who had been economically marginalized by state domination of forest resources. (Note 32)

Laos is a landlocked, predominantly mountainous nation in the interior of mainland Southeast Asia. (Note 33) The forests of Laos provide critical watershed services to Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. They also provide a habitat for a diverse plant and animal species, as well as varied ethnic groups that have lived in the region for thousands of years. In 1940, evergreen and monsoon forests covered 70 percent of Laos, or about 17 million hectares. Estimates regarding current forest cover vary, but it is clear that substantial deforestation has occurred in recent decades. In 1989, the National Forest Inventory, supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), determined that 47 percent of the country retained forest cover, while the GTZ Forest Cover Monitoring Project calculated natural forest area at 40 percent four years later in 1993.

The population of Laos is nearly 5 million, 90 percent of which is heavily dependent on natural resources for their survival. The majority of the population are lowland Lao (Lao Lum, 55 percent). In addition, there are some 40 ethnic groups who are broadly divided between the Lao Theung, or midland Lao (30 percent), and the Lao Sung, or highland Lao (15 percent). (Note 34) Midland Lao tribes include the Khmu and Htin, while highland Lao comprise the Hmong, Akha, and other groups. The lowland Lao practice largely rainfed-bunded rice agriculture on permanent fields whereas the upland ethnic minority groups are predominantly swidden cultivators whose long rotation fallow cycle systems vary widely. In most communities, forest dependence is high, both for subsistence goods and for NTFPs that provide a source of cash. Although resource use systems are diverse, a reflection of Laos's many ethnic communities, it is estimated that one-third to one-half of the country's families are engaged in some form of shifting cultivation.

Because of its physical isolation and decades of political instability, Laos has remained relatively remote and thus its natural forests are in better condition than those of neighboring countries. Laos has a modest government infrastructure centered in Vientiane, with presence at the provincial and district levels. With an extremely limited tax base, this rugged nation has little money to invest in developing and sustaining a village governmental structure. Instead, many communities retain considerable autonomy and rely on their indigenous institutions for local governance and resource management. Innovative village forestry policies and programs in Laos attest to this. The FINNIDA/World Bank FOMACOP project document emphasizes that while "all Lao forests belong to the national community. Knowing its staffing and other resource limitations that keep it from properly and sustainably managing the forests, the state is promoting village forestry." (Note 35)

With a decline in timber prices, profits from the timber industry are failing off sharply. In 1996, before the Asian economic crisis began, logs sold at $130 to $140 per cubic meter and the government then extracted a royalty of around $50 per cubic meter after sale. By November 1998, the same quality timber was trading as low as $50 per cubic meter, which hardly covered the logging and transportation costs that average $30 per cubic meter. (Note 36) As the market collapses, demand is strongest only for the highest-grade commercial dipterocarp species, which results in what is known as "high grading" of the forest. Since the species with high market value are the key components of the forest canopy, their removal will undermine the forest structure.

It is estimated that swidden cultivators in Laos open between 300,000 to 600,000 hectares of land each year, and that 20 to 30 percent of all forestland may be involved in long rotation agriculture under cycles of 5 to 15 years. (Note 37) Researchers in Laos have determined that it is important to distinguish between two categories of shifting cultivators. Traditional swiddening communities practice sustainable long rotation agriculture and possess land rights that are recognized by their own members as well as neighboring communities. By contrast, transitional shifting cultivators are often landless farmers who leave their lowland villages and enter upland areas in the wake of logging operations. They often have no rights in the area under either customary or formal law and frequently lack local knowledge of their new environment and how to manage it. This distinction has only begun to affect the perspective of policy makers.

In the 1970s, Laos adopted a strategy to resettle shifting cultivators and nearly 20,000 families moved during the decade. This approach was later terminated because it was costly and ineffectual; many families simply returned to their old homes. Relocation is still happening, however, in areas where dams are being developed. The 1986 Fourth Party Congress formulated a plan to restrict "slash and burn agriculture" and promote "fixed cultivate/occupation" for some 277,000 families of shifting farmers. However, the plan was never implemented. (Note 38) The Tropical Forestry Action Plan also targeted shifting cultivators as a major forestry problem, suggesting plantation forestry projects to reduce pressure on the land.

Of the four Mekong River nations, Laos is the only one that has a clear policy supporting community management of forests: the Village Forestry Law. The implementation of this policy has received substantial support from international development agencies. The Lao-Swedish Forestry Program and the FINNIDA/World Bank FOMACOP projects both finance land-and forest-use planning projects in a number of districts, and provide a team of expatriate advisers tied to the Department of Forestry. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) supports projects that involve communities around protected areas, including in-depth studies of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (see Box 6).

Many communities continue to depend on long rotation agriculture and hunting and gathering within natural forest environments, and commercial timber extraction may negatively impact primary systems of subsistence. One study of eight villages in Laos found that 121 different forest products and animals were gathered and hunted and that commercial logging operations resulted in dramatic reductions in wild animal populations, loss of collection areas, blocking of forest paths, and the drying up of streams and rivers. (Note 40) Indigenous resource management systems are oriented very differently from large-scale commercial operations, in that they are not driven by principles of profit maximization within relatively short time frames. Given the short time frame of the FINNIDA/World Bank-funded FOMACOP project, it may be difficult to reconcile resource use strategies with such different goals, technologies, and management needs.

The Philippines is an archipelago with over 7,000 islands, the largest being Luzon to the north and Mindanao in the south, which constitute 68 percent of the land area. Most islands in the chain have mountainous interiors rising from 1,000 to 2,500 meters above sea level. This topography supports diverse forest ecosystems, as well as causing violent hydrological patterns that can promote severe erosion if forest cover is removed. Lowland coastal plains are narrow, even on the larger islands they rarely extend more than 15 kilometers inland. The Philippines possesses approximately 150 cultural communities that can be broadly divided into those that are mainstream, sea-based, or upland cultures. Mainstream peoples include dominant groups like the Ilokano, Tagalog, and Cebuano communities that populate lowland agriculture plains and many urban centers. Sea based peoples, often Islamic, reside in coastal areas, particularly in western Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago of the southern Philippines. Most upland communities are the indigenous forest peoples of the Philippines, with over 100 distinctive ethno-linguistic groups present throughout the country. (Note 41) While upland communities often hold marginal positions within the national political and economic scene, they have become key actors in community-based forest management programs emerging over the past decade, as well as the potential beneficiaries of new policies that recognize ancestral domain claims to upland forests.

Over the past 15 years, the Philippines has been a leader in Southeast Asia in formulating innovative community forestry policy and programs. (Note 42) Through a variety of tenure mechanisms, including individual, community, and indigenous people's stewardship agreements, millions of hectares of designated public forestlands have been placed under local management. But despite the combined efforts of many committed government planners, NGOs, development agency staff, and university-based researchers, progress in transferring stewardship rights to millions of upland residents is threatened by a changing political environment and outside economic interests. Formally engaging poor upland communities in sustainable natural resource management is a critical step in stabilizing the Philippines' degrading watersheds.

After steady loss of forest throughout the era of American colonial rule, deforestation was accelerated under the Marcos government with the expansion of commercial logging and the extension of estate crops. In 1960, approximately 45 percent of the country possessed forest cover. By 1970, the forested area had declined to 34 percent, failing to 27 percent in 1980 and then 22 percent by 1987 shortly after the end of the Marcos administration. By the late 1980s, 24 of the 34 islands that had been densely forested at the beginning of the century had less than 10 per cent forest cover. Most of the remaining natural forest is secondary growth or high-elevation mossy forest. Only 800,000 hectares of dipterocarp primary forest remain, largely at elevations of 500-1000 meters, representing less than 3 percent of total land area. (Note 43)

Deforestation in the Philippines and the displacement of millions of upland residents has been linked to government corruption and policy failures. The exploitative logging practices of concessionaires set an example of unsustainable resource use for millions of poor migrants who followed logging roads into the uplands. The financial returns from logging were concentrated in the hands of a small group of elite families. This exacerbated the Problem of unequal distribution of income, still one of the greatest structural problems faced by the Philippines. Between 1972 and 1988, the Philippine logging industry is estimated to have generated US $43 billion form the cutting of nearly 9 million hectares of forest. Much of the money flowed into foreign bank accounts. (Note 44)

The Philippine government has used timber license agreements (TLAs) to grant concessionaires the right to cut trees on public forestlands. Typically, TLA concessions range from in 40,000 to 60,000 hectares, though President Marcos granted his friends concessions of more than 100,000 hectares. Records show that timber concessions rose from 5.5 million hectares in 1960 to more than 11 million hectares in the 1970s, covering more than one-third of the total land area of the Philippines. In 1969, there were 58 timber licensees with "special permits" to cut down trees, by 1976 the number of concessionaires dramatically increased to 476. (Note 45) The biased granting of TLAs and other timber licenses in recent decades to elite Filipino families and foreign investors has resulted in the dislocation of indigenous peoples and other upland dwellers. TLAs have been used by the government officials as an instrument of control; to help friends, to reward loyal supporters, to purchase political favors, and to buy off rebels.

The 1995 Mining Act, passed during the Ramos administration in order to attract foreign investment, also generates concern among community forestry advocates. In recent months, the Estrada government has received a flood of mining applications, mostly for open pit extraction within remaining forest reserves. Under the act, mining companies hold rights to tree cutting and water resources as well as rights of easement to the area. Given the domestic and international pressure to generate foreign exchange, there is a danger that policies protecting the environment and upland peoples approved during the Aquino and Ramos administrations will revert to those favoring resource control by outside interests. During the Marcos era, those policies resulted in unsustainable resource use and social unrest. The growing interest in mining and industrial reforestation may signal a change in priorities that stress more foreign investment and less community resource management. Part V, will present case studies from upland communities in the Pantaran Mountains that show how forest-dependent peoples have benefited from programs that recognize their ancestral domain and describe the continued threat they face from outside interests eager to exploit their natural resources.

Thailand, like its mainland Southeast Asian neighbors, was once heavily forested (Note 46). In 1953, it is estimated that 60 percent of the country possessed dense natural forest cover. Commercial timber exploitation, combined with land clearing by both local and migrant farmers, reduced forest cover by one-half over the next thirty years (Note 47). Between 1961 and 1991, Thailand's population rose from 23 million to 58 million and in some regions like the northeast, forests were viewed as a frontier area, with "open access" resources capable of providing farmland for rural families. By 1995, the official estimate of forest area was 26 percent of the land but conservation groups maintain that it may be as low as 18 percent, if plantations are excluded.

In 1989, public concern over disastrous flooding and landslides in southern Thailand resulted in a national logging ban. This ban marked an important policy shift towards greater emphasis on the involvement of communities in forest management activities (Note 48). Thailand's domestic timber supplies are increasingly dependent on imported logs from Burma, Laos and Cambodia. Despite the logging ban and rising imports, Thai forests continue to disappear. Within Thailand, illegal logging in national parks and conservation areas continues, sometimes facilitated by local elite's, corrupt government officials, and politicians. While some communities are strategically positioned to protect the remaining resources from outside interests, others are hired as illegal loggers by timber smugglers. The Salween logging scandal of early 1998 dramatically illustrate these issues and placed advocates of stronger community forest management policies in a national debate with those supporting strict conservation and even community exclusion from some protected areas. (Note 49)

Over the past 30 years, a number of policies supported by the Ministry of Interior, the military, and the RFD legitimized the expansion of communities into forest reserves, especially in northeastern Thailand. These included the establishment in 1975 of the National Forestland Management Division (NFLMD) within the RFD to administer the Forest Village Program and the national Forestland Allotment (STK) Project. To support these programs the Thai cabinet gave amnesty to all illegal residents in reserved forest. These initiatives hoped to limit forestland degradation, restrict illegal encroachment on reserved forestlands, consolidate residents into permanent settlements and further national internal security. Some analysts feel these programs succeeded in slowing encroachment on reserved forestlands by imposing limits on the amount of land households could claim for agriculture. (Note 50)

Thailand has a diverse and rich tradition of household and communal natural resource management systems. Shifting demographics, as well as political and socioeconomic changes are leading to the formation of new community-based forest management groups as well. A national inventory conducted by the Royal Forest Department in 1992 documented over 12,000 rural groups Protecting forest Patches ranging in size from as few as I hectare to as many as 4,000 hectares. (Note 51)

As deforestation has progressed, Thailand has seen a rapid decline in its rich biodiversity and loss of forest habitat. Environmental NGOs, sometimes referred to as the "dark green" in Thailand, have strong support within segments of the RFD, academic institutions, and Bangkok's middle class. Environmental groups have effectively lobbied for more of the nation's forests to be designated as national parks and sanctuaries. The policy commitment to conservation is reflected in the 1993 Forestry Master Plan mandating 42 national parks and 31 wildlife sanctuaries to be added to the 119 existing conservation areas. Current estimates indicate that the creation of new protected areas would require 3.3 million hectares. (Note 52)

Past problems with resettlement schemes have also raised questions regarding the wisdom, practicality, and political acceptability of projects that dislocate upland villages. During the early 1990s, some upland communities under threat of resettlement began organizing into more effective, multi-village networks to resist government programs. In 1994, stemming from concerns over problems with resettlement projects and growing local and media opposition, Thai policy makers postponed a number of community relocation projects. In Part V, the Thai case study of the Northern Farmers Network illustrates how some upland communities are building federations to better exchange information and allow their views to be represented in dialogues with government and other stakeholder groups, including urban-based, environmental NGOs.

Informal community forest management groups, however, are still not officially recognized and communities remain insecure regarding their future. In March 1998, 56 upland farmers, all from ethnic minorities, were illegally arrested on charges of setting forest fires during the drought (Note 54). According to the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, "the fires were caused by hill tribe people." But the Ethnic Studies Network at Chiang Mai University contends that "Pang Daeng was targeted because its residents are predominantly hill tribe minorities—easy and frequent scapegoats because they are poor, powerless and looked down upon by the lowland Thai" (Note 55). Fundamental disagreements within Thai society concerning the rights of ethnic minorities have slowed progress in developing a clear forest management policy in the north. Communities require greater security of tenure to enable them to be effective forest custodians.

While CFM legislation has not yet been approved, the concept has gained legal support under the new constitution and decentralization laws. The 1992 Tambon Administration Organization Act (TAO) strengthens the role of village governments in forest use and planning decision making. In the 1997 Constitution, Article 45 vests traditional communities with the right and duty to manage resources where they live. Unfortunately, without enabling CFM laws, current conservation policies are at odds with the community rights provisions listed in the Constitution. A recent agreement regarding the legal definition of community forests may help break the policy stalemate. The new definition extends RFD classifications to acknowledge traditional use forest categories, including indigenous types of forest conservation (Note 56). The CFM bill will formally recognize communities as resource managers, even within protected areas.

New constitutional and legal provisions are creating an opening for the RFD to develop and strengthen collaborative partnerships with village (Tambon) government and local communities. These partnerships are being forged through four pilot projects: community forests within buffer zones, small-scale forest plantations for Tambon councils, forest and forest protection, and service support for forest management activities (Note 57). Under these pilot projects, the RFD is working with NGOs and Tambon government partners. It is anticipated that when the Community Forestry Bill is passed, it will provide a sufficient legal basis to move beyond temporary pilot projects into an enduring national program.

Vietnam rises from its long and narrow eastern coastal plain into the Annamite mountain chain that forms its natural border with Laos and Cambodia. Three-quarters of the country is hilly or mountainous, climbing to over 3000 meters at its highest point. Once densely forested, it is now left with only 10 percent closed tropical forest. Vietnam has many indigenous systems of forest management. (Note 58) While the Kinh make up 87 percent of the population, other cultural communities are often the dominant groups in many upland areas. Out of 53 ethnic minorities, 52 live in the uplands. Forty-six of the ethnic groups utilize a variety of shifting cultivation systems, requiring a careful linking of agriculture and forest resource use practices. Each ethnic community possesses its own distinctive system of institutions, leaders, rules, and rights for managing forest and agricultural lands and water resources.

Forestlands were subdivided into those used for cultivation, those under exploitation for timber, and those off limits to exploitation, including upper slopes and ridge crests. The community prohibited or limited the exploitation of land or forests within its territory by persons from the outside—especially the utilization of virgin land covered by primary forests (Note 60). Within the forest, households often held specific rights to certain precious woods, trees with bees' nests, and naturally growing herbs.

The government nationalized large areas of land in the midland and upland regions of northern Vietnam in the late 1950s and early '60s. Forestland with a slope above 25 degrees was designated for forestry and put under the management of State Forest Enterprises. Control over the management of forest resources was centralized. In the highlands, state forest management was part of a larger attempt to transform the traditional use of rural resources and the underlying social structure. As in the lowlands, people in the highlands formed agricultural producer cooperatives. Under the cooperative, the land was farmed collectively and the products shared proportionate to the expenditure of labor. The cooperatives were relatively free from state interventions in sharp contrast to the centralized control over the forests. (Note 61) By 1968, nine out of ten agricultural households in the northern mountains belonged to cooperatives. (Note 62)

Until the early 1990s, Vietnamese forest policy was based on direct state involvement in the management, exploitation, processing, and distribution of the country's forest resources in order to achieve their rational utilization. The transformation of social structures and resource use also included massive programs of resettlement and sedentarization. Between the late 1960s and early '90s, North Vietnam and then the unified country of Vietnam resettled around 5 million people from lowland provinces into the uplands. (Note 63) The programs were designed to increase cultivation and to exploit the natural resources in areas seen as under utilized. The Fixed Cultivation and Sedentarization Program had the objective of providing swidden farmers with permanent settlements either in the same area or in more fertile, more accessible, non-catchment areas at lower altitudes. By 1990, the program included 1.9 million highland people. (Note 64) In addition, the government envisions state forest and agricultural enterprises as playing important roles as indicators of regional development in the highlands.

This dramatic shift in Vietnam's approach to forest management brought about a drastic decline in the country's forest resources. In 1991, the Ministry of Forestry classified 10 out of 19 million hectares of designated forestland as barren because they were not covered with trees. (Note 65) During the 1980s, the annual loss of forest was reported as 110,000 hectares for the whole country. (Note 66) Though efforts at reforestation have been impressive, plantations are much poorer than the natural forest they have replaced. In recent years, even government reports have linked the striking loss of forest resources to direct state forest management.

The state, however, was often not able to enforce its legal restrictions. The people continued using the forests for subsistence and to generate income. Particularly in remote areas, where lack of infrastructure hampered state management, local people often managed the forests. Ethnic minority groups practiced a diverse range of swidden cultivation systems with various consequences for the forest. In some places, local users protected watershed forests, funeral forests, and forests with cultural and human-ecological significance. However, restricting local rights over forestlands provided little incentive for communities to conserve these resources. Not surprisingly, the Ministry of Forestry noted in 1991 that many areas experienced a "continuing expansion of agriculture into such forestland that is of reasonable fertility and accessibility." (Note 67)

A decree issued in 1994 specifies that use rights granted for forestland should extend over a period of 50 years, with the proviso that households use it for agroforestry. The management of forest zoned for production purposes has generally followed a farm-household model. Farm-households receive long-term rights for barren land and land with planted forest located outside critical watershed areas. The farm-household model has produced remarkable results in meeting and even surpassing reforestation targets, primarily in areas where families receive support through national and international programs and where there is good market access. Extensive forest plantations were established on hills in the Vietnamese mid-lands, once a symbol of land degradation and unproductive land Use. (Note 68)