Southeast Asia is one of the richest regions in the world in terms of its varied human-ecosystems. The diversity of cultural groups, combined with one of the world's richest genetic pools, has resulted in a multiplicity of forest-use systems. For thousands of years, the upper and lower watersheds of the major mainland rivers as well as the entire island archipelago of Southeast Asia were carpeted with dense rain forest. Tribal communities fished, hunted and gathered in the forest, and practiced long rotation agriculture. Thousands of long rotational swidden systems were developed for a wide variety of lowland rain forests, swamp forests, mountain forests, monsoon forests, and mangrove forests.
Each country possesses hundreds of agro-forestry systems, mixed tree gardens, and natural forest product gathering and hunting strategies. A single forest garden often contains hundreds of plant species, mostly well known and well-used by local populations. Recent studies of indigenous forest management systems show that they often retain 50 to 80 percent of the biodiversity found in neighboring natural forest ecosystems (
Note 1). Systems of sustainable use evolved over thousands of years based on traditional knowledge passed from one generation to the next. While indigenous peoples manipulated the natural environment to meet their needs, they did so in a way that allowed much of Southeast Asia's forest cover to remain intact.This report explores the roles communities and other forest stakeholders play as forest managers across the Southeast Asia region. Where authority is ultimately vested and how decisions are made regarding forest management goals and operational responsibilities is a political issue in Asian countries. As this report will show, there are forces throughout Southeast Asia that promote devolution downwards towards the community, as well as powers that draw that authority towards the center and upwards. The forest is a contested domain and the nature of this tension is a primary topic. This report focuses on the issue of community control of forestlands both through legal frameworks and in the field.
This section begins with a brief overview of two major paradigms that reflect separate and distinctive approaches to forest stewardship: the state versus community forest management (CFM). There are some areas of overlap, with opportunities for varying degrees of collaboration and participation, yet it is also clear that there are profound differences that necessarily affect any resource management strategy. Over the past three decades, community-based forest management (CBFM) programs have acquired new names like participatory forestry, joint forest management (JFM), and village forestry while the scope of the role for rural people has broadened as well. The process of trying to integrate the different agendas of the state, development agencies, and communities has resulted in some progress in merging the forest management goals and strategies. But, it has also blurred fundamental differences that require illumination and high-level policy debate if they are to be resolved. The following list presents a brief summation of some of these important differences: short and long term goals, technologies, control mechanisms, orientation in space and time, and modes of production.
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STATE |
COMMUNITY |
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Centralized management |
Decentralized management |
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Revenue orientation |
Resource orientation |
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Large working plans |
Localized use strategies |
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Target orientation |
Process orientation |
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Unilateral decision making |
Participatory decision making |
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Punitive rules |
Group pressure |
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Hierarchical forest departments |
Non-hierarchical people's institutions |
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Area management |
Site specific management |
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Timber production |
Multiple products combined with environmental functions |
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Single technical package |
Diverse technologies |
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Fixed procedures |
Experimentation and flexibility |
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Single species |
Multispecies and multi-tier forestry and agroforestry |
Most of Southeast Asia's forestland was placed under state control during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, largely dictated by the European colonial administrations of the era. The process of land nationalization was sequential and multi-faceted, involving the formulation of laws to legitimize the state property regime and the development of bureaucratic institutions created to implement claims of governments. Western concepts of nature preservation, silviculture, and industrial forestry provided a scientific basis for developing management goals and mechanisms for administering newly demarcated public forestlands. Indigenous forest management practices, such as long rotation swidden agriculture, agro- forestry, hunting and gathering regimes, often found little or no recognition in these new systems of land tenure and forest laws as they were based on European concepts of land ownership, reflecting very different modes of production and legal traditions.
Throughout Southeast Asia, a discourse of state forestry was established drawing on constitutions, laws, and other legislation that largely rejected local claims to forest resources. This was based on a growing body of decrees, regulations, codes, and other government declarations that reinforced the de jure rights of the state vested through national constitutions and agrarian laws. In many cases, communities continued to be the de facto users and managers of forest, until the state or other entities authorized by the government, usually state forest enterprises or private sector leases, began exploiting the resources. When confrontations between state and local users occurred, the former almost always prevailed, although resistance often continued in the form of guerilla activities, sabotage, petty theft, and arson.
The globalization of the world economy reinforced state claims to resources while facilitating their exploitation by national and transnational companies. Political leaders found they could control the leasing of large tracts of forest for timber and mineral extraction that provides a wealth of money, power, and influence. With the increasing centralization of forest control, national elite acquired hundreds of thousands, and even millions of hectares of land to log, mine, and establish estate crops. From the 1970s through the mid-'90's, international development organizations and large private banks financed these activities, perceiving these large private sector initiatives to be consistent with prevailing paradigms for economic development. Since 1997, however, the onset of the Asian economic ecession has drawn global attention to the corrupt practices and inequities apparent in the region's economies, including the state forestry sector.
There is growing recognition that corruption in the forestry sector begins at the top, where centralized control is frequently concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of political and economic elite. This pattern is also reflected at more local levels where provincial, district, or sub-district government officials may establish patronage links with local businessmen. What Dauvergne describes in Indonesia is true of many countries in the region: "the result is rampant illegal logging, timber smuggling, tax and royalty evasion, flagrant violations of logging rules, and avoidance of reforestation duties." (
Note 2) The World Bank, the IMF, and other development agencies continue to view these problems as being rooted in the poor implementation of forest policies, rather than questioning the basic viability of state forestry. But, the massive failure of forest policies for half a century or more throughout the region requires that we look beyond the managerial and technical problems facing forestry agencies to explore alternative management paradigms, community forestry being a logical candidate.
While autonomous, communal systems of management have existed in Southeast Asia for centuries, state sponsored social and community forestry projects are a recent invention. As Gilmour and Fisher note, "The early approaches to community-based forestry in the 1970s were referred to as "social forestry," and were often limited to hiring local villagers to establish wood lots. (
Note 3) Fundamental questions regarding community rights and responsibilities for forest resource management were usually beyond the mandate of state sponsored projects. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defined CFM very broadly in 1978 as "any situation which intimately involves local people in a forestry activity." (Note 4) But, Gilmour and Fisher have extended this definition to emphasize issues of authority that exist within CBFM. They now define it as: "the control and management of forest resources by the rural people who use them especially for domestic purposes and as an integral part of their farming system." (Note 5) The question of control is arguably the most important and controversial issue surrounding the debate regarding the role of communities in the management of the region's forests. Increasingly, throughout Southeast Asia, community forestry is being recast as a political issue, driven by an emerging peoples' movement.Even at the end of the twentieth century, indigenous resource use practices have not disappeared, instead many Southeast Asian communities are adapting their resource use systems to changing social and political conditions and market trends. While greater emphasis is being placed on commercial forest products, subsistence goods still retain a significant if not dominant role in local management activities. Although most Southeast Asian governments give little recognition to communal resource management institutions, village elders, clan chiefs, and other traditional community leaders and their members continue to play important roles in guiding the use of farmlands, water sources, pasturelands, and forests. In Laos, for example, 80 percent or more of all forestlands remains under indigenous systems of management. In Indonesia, local communities retain control over substantial tracts of forest often operating alongside commercial enterprises. These indigenous patterns of stewardship of the natural environment exist in the shadows, however, as they are given little or no recognition under the land laws and policies in most Southeast Asian nations.
In this era of development, traditional resource use systems have often been viewed as obsolete, uneconomical, and inefficient. Despite a growing body of scientific research that indicates that many indigenous forestry and agroforestry systems are economically productive, possess an ability to mimic natural environments, and are remarkably compatible with local ecosystems, they receive little support from government or development agencies, either legally or financially. Instead, government planners sign away hundreds of thousands of hectares of natural forests to foreign logging firms, mining concessions, or estate crop operators, while disregarding evidence that local people have effectively acted as resource stewards for generations.
The broad discrepancy in management characteristics between the state and rural forest-dependent communities suggests that it may be important to support community forestry as a separate and distinctive approach to natural forest management. Integrating it as a minor program within the state model as has been attempted in recent decades has failed to empower community forest managers. By highlighting these fundamental differences in management goals and perspective toward the natural environment, perhaps a new paradigm can evolve that can more equitably address the increasing pressures on Southeast Asia's resources.
The following themes provide a brief overview of rapid population growth, land and forest tenure conflicts, industrial logging, estate crops, mining, and fire. These are all topics of major social significance and of special relevance for community forest management. These topics will be briefly discussed in this section and echoed through subsequent parts of this report dealing with national forest policies, development agency strategies, and field situations.
Population growth and increasing per capita consumption of many forest products in developed countries has led to expanding pressure on Asia's forests. On the island of Java, for example, the population has increased from 3 to 100 million over the past two centuries. Indonesia now has over 200 million people, with projections of 350 million for the year 2020. (
Note 6) Asia's population is estimated to reach 4.3 billion by 2025. Asia currently has less forest per capita than any region on earth—under 0.2 hectares per person. (Note 7)In Southeast Asia, there are an estimated 80 to 100 million people who reside on land classified as public forest, and these numbers will likely double over the next 20 to 30 years. Moreover, there are an additional 200 million rural residents who are to varying degrees dependent on forest products for their survival. Finally, 150 million urban dwellers rely on upper watershed forests to provide critical environmental services.
The linkages between population growth and forest loss, however, are not straightforward. It is easy to blame population expansion for natural resource degradation, rather than focusing on other causal factors such as policy failure, corruption, and the uncontrolled activities of the private sector. As Daniel Bromley has noted: "Blaming population growth allows inept or corrupt governments to shift the blame for either their behavior or their inaction, as the case may be, to 'promiscuous' peasants." (
Note 8) In fact, there is growing evidence that increased use of local resources can encourage communities to implement tighter controls and more sustainable systems of management. (Note 9) Nonetheless, the long-term impact of expanding rural and urban populations will place increasing pressure on the natural resource base. Growing populations impact the forests by increasing demands for more agricultural land, fuelwood, and other forest products. Other factors that impact forest loss are: 1) the breakdown of local systems of management, 2) market and policy failures, 3) rapid commercialization of natural resources, 4) resource tenure structures that encourage short-term exploitation and 5) institutional weaknesses characterized by corruption practices. (Note 10)
Tenure is sometimes referred to as a "bundle of rights," recognized either by law or custom. Tenure security is the degree to which an individual or group feels its relationship to a place or the resources that support them are in jeopardy. Tenure systems, especially customary rules and rights found in rural Southeast Asia, are highly diverse. They cover land, trees, and water, as well as specific products like birds' nests, gums and resins, fruit, honey, specialty woods, and hundreds of other items. Individual and family rights are often nested within an overall framework of community administration. Traditional tenure systems tend to be flexible, so that rights can flow outward to users, expand and contract based on demand, and be adjusted in response to good or poor practice. Individuals and families are accountable to the community, the community in turn to its members, and, finally, a balanced relationship with neighboring communities must be maintained. Tenure conflicts are to be avoided, first through continuing efforts of members to avoid offending others, and then through mediation at increasing levels of authority.
Traditional tenure systems have been the primary mechanism for allocating natural forest resource use among local populations for thousands of years. The Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic empires of Southeast Asia prior to the colonial period had limited control beyond the lowland agricultural plains. Up to the end of World War II, though colonial governments declared most of the region's forests to be state domain, effective administration of Southeast Asia's 500 million hectares of forest was limited to a relatively small number of timber production areas with road access. Only during the past 50 years have newly independent nations in Southeast Asia begun taking more comprehensive management control of upland forests by setting up new structures of local governance and imposing national land laws, while rarely recognizing indigenous tenure practices. Instead, governments have generally assumed public forestlands are freely available for leasing to state corporations, private enterprises, or for management by new local government administrators.
The absence of legal rights in much of the region's natural forestlands has left local communities highly vulnerable to the interests of outside actors, be they governments, corporations, or migrant settlers. The failure by most of the governments of Southeast Asia to recognize the territorial rights of indigenous and other traditional peoples is increasingly acknowledged to be a fundamental cause of deforestation (
Note 11). Insecurity of tenure can generate perverse incentives for sustainable management—for local populations as well as private companies. Although much of the land in these countries was nationalized over the past few hundred years, in recent decades the encroachment of external forces has intensified, destabilizing and eroding local resource management systems. What Steven Lawry observes of sub-Saharan Africa is also true of many parts of Southeast Asia: "While states have usurped the last vestiges of local control through legal reform, they have been unable to put in place an effective alternative system for managing collective resources'" (Note 12). Still, in many of the more remote forest areas and watersheds of mainland and insular Southeast Asia, customary tenure practices continue to guide communal resource management, despite the absence of formal recognition. The question is whether they will continue to be eroded or whether an appropriate marriage of supportive policies and effective programs will re-energize local systems of community resource stewardship.Since the 1960s, for example, the Indonesian government has transferred rights to approximately one-third of the national land area to a small group of people with powerful political connections. While much of the 65 million hectares was initially designated for long rotational timber harvesting, the selective-felling system failed due to overlogging, fires, and other disturbances. Wealthy families have attempted to hang on to their lease-holds by clearfelling them for pulp, converting them to plantation crops, or exploiting their mineral resources. Millions of local residents lost their ancestral lands in the process and there has been little recourse through the judicial system.
Southeast Asian countries are challenged by the great differences between modem government land laws and customary tenure traditions. Even after laws are enacted that can link modem and traditional forest tenure systems, the process of delineating tenure authorities through negotiations and mapping is an immense task. The bureaucratic capacity, procedures, and skills to implement national public land reform is also woefully limited throughout the region. Further, much forestland has already been leased to outside companies or placed under the administration of state corporations, and pressure to exploit forestlands for foreign exchange has grown with the economic recession of the past two years. Bringing land security to upland forest regions will require a careful crafting of enabling policies, a strong political will, and the capacity to implement them.
No force has transformed the natural forests of Southeast Asia so rapidly as industrial logging. Commercial timber extraction has occurred in the region for centuries, but only in the last 100 years have expanding international markets, together with new felling, extraction, and transportation technologies increased the rate of logging to its current high levels. Today, the international timber trade is valued at $ 100 billion a year (
Note 13). For many Southeast Asian nations, timber is a resource that can be sold on international markets to generate foreign exchange. Nations with large debts to development banks as well as private commercial lending institutions require foreign currencies to service their loans. With the onset of the Asian economic recession in 1997, alternative sources of foreign exchange from the manufacturing sector declined sharply and natural resource extraction is seen as a primary means of meeting the need for hard currency. The International Monetary Fund and other global financial bodies have urged nations not to default on their debts and risk jeopardizing their credit status. As a result, the urgency to generate dollars through timber sales has increased, despite a wood glut in the global market and historically low prices from logs and plywood.Logging is very difficult for governments to regulate and timber revenues are hard to capture. According to a recent study by the World Wildlife Fund: "Virtually all logging for export currently taking place in India, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and the Philippines is illegal ... It is estimated that at least a third of Malaysian logging may be illegal and as much as 95 percent in Indonesia is not wholly legal." (
Note 14) While timber operations are not solely the work of transnational corporations (TNCs), these companies have the advantage of a foreign base and high mobility, often taking advantage of political instability, economic crises, and difficult-to-monitor operations in remote areas. TNCs are often able to circumvent regulations and barriers that protect the environment and local forest communities. Transnational firms have experienced a rapid increase in their capacity to roam the world in search of new forests to exploit. TNCs have been charged with a wide range of illegal practices, including overextraction, logging in protected areas, logging outside concession areas and in the domains of indigenous peoples, as well as such fraudulent actions as bribery, illegal exports, forgery, the underreporting of harvests, and transfer pricing. (Note 15)Samling Corporation, a Malaysian timber giant, landed logging rights to natural forests covering 800,000 hectares in Cambodia in 1994. The four-page agreement gave Samling control over 4.5 percent of the nation's land area, with an eight-year tax holiday, an automatic option to renew for 30 years, and a requirement of spending only $ 100,000 for reseeding. Cambodia's National Assembly approved this land grant without debate. (
Note 16) In Ratanakiri province, Macro-Panin, an Indonesian consortium, negotiated a logging concession for 1.5 million hectares, the equivalent of 20 percent of the nation's remaining forests and the ancestral domain of a number of ethnic minority communities. (Note 17) By the end of 1998, the Cambodian government had allocated logging rights for approximately 40 percent of the country's territory to foreign firms. Estimates indicate that Samling is harvesting 50 cubic meters of timber per hectare, five times what is considered a sustainable yield. Ministry of Agriculture officials report being turned away by concessionaires when they attempt to monitor logging activities (Note 18). According to one report, "People living within the boundaries of its concession have been prevented from cutting trees for fuel, saw-mills for local use have been closed down, and the company has brought in foreign guards to protect its interests." (Note 19)
A logging truck outside Phnom Penh is one of many operators that transport timber in Cambodia (photo: Poffenberger)
A joint venture coal company operatesthis strip mine on logged-over lowland rain forests 80 kilometers from
Samarinda, East Kalimantan. (photo: Poffenberger)
A recent financial analysis of the timber trade indicates that transnational logging companies take most of their revenues abroad, with as little as 9 percent remaining in the producing country. When logs are processed into sawn timber and other wood products, 65 to 90 percent of earnings by TNCs still leave the country. (
Note 20) An economic valuation of old growth logging in the Philippines found that the return on harvest was a negative $130 to $1,175 per hectare, after calculating replanting costs and off-site damages. (Note 21) Despite the costs to local communities and national governments, TNCs now control an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the trade in wood, pulp, and paper products, with a market value of $110 billion in 1995. (Note 22) Only 350 companies control 40 percent of the world trade, many with sales volumes that are higher than the entire GDP of many countries. The Environmental Investigation Agency concluded that:In the absence of restrictive trade barriers and without adequate global institutions to regulate their activities, TNCs now enjoy unprecedented freedom to roam the globe in their quest for profits. Dwarfed by the economic might of these super-corporations, and eager for revenue, many countries are seemingly powerless to regulate the management of their precious natural resources. (
As this brief review suggests, industrial logging operations threaten forest-dependent communities, as well as national societies. Remote forest communities are poorly positioned to resist timber extraction by private companies sanctioned by national governments. The actions of TNCs are further supported by some developed countries that provide a market for their timber products. Once logging operations are completed, access roads built for timber extraction often expose forest communities to an influx of migrant families in search of agricultural land, placing further pressure on forest and land resources. The impact of TNCs and illegal logging operations on community forest management efforts will be examined in case studies from Cambodia and the Philippines in Part V.
Mining poses a growing threat to natural forests and rural communities throughout Southeast Asia. A recent IUCN report found that the expansion of mining is being driven by trade liberalization, technological change, debt, corruption, and influence from large corporations. (
Note 24) In recent years, the Philippines and other countries in the region have attempted to attract foreign investment in mining. The 1995 Philippine mining code extends full ownership rights to foreign firms, eliminates taxes for ten years, and allows for total repatriation of profits, leaving one-quarter of the land area available for lease.Environmental disturbance from mining operations has immense impact on site as well as downstream. Each ton of silver and gold ore extracted from open pits generates between 1 and 3 million tons of waste, contaminated with chemicals like cyanide, sulfuric acid, and heavy metal toxins that often enter hydrological systems. In the province of Irian Jaya in Indonesia, the world's largest gold mine owned by Freeport McMoran (USA) and Rio Tinto (UK and Australia) discharges some 110,000 tons of toxic waste daily into the Ajikwa River. The Amungme tribal council has sued Freeport, which hold's a mining license for 2.6 million hectares, after they and the neighboring Ekari and Komoro tribes were displaced from their ancestral lands. The tribes rejected the company's compensation offer as inadequate. (
Note 25) Tribal actions to protect their lands have resulted in conflict with the Indonesian military, which has been called in to suppress local communities.The economic recession has clearly placed great pressure on the Indonesian government to lease mining rights on public forestlands. At present, 269 contracts have been approved for gold, nickel, diamonds and coal, 50 contracts being awarded in February 1998 alone, about six months after the recession began (
Note 26). Concerned by the growth of transnational mining operations, an international meeting of indigenous peoples held in 1996 declared: "no activities must take place on Indigenous Peoples' territories without their full and informed consent through their representative institutions, including the power of veto." (Note 27) While indigenous people's protest with growing urgency, large corporations and the international monetary community take advantage of the greater trend towards global free trade and increased foreign investment, breaking down national regulatory barriers and leaving upland forests and the communities that inhabit them increasingly vulnerable.
Forest fires in Southeast Asia have received international attention in recent years. Millions of hectares have burned in Borneo, the Philippines, Sumatra, and Mainland Southeast Asia. In 1982-83, fires burned an estimated 3 million hectares on the island of Borneo. In 1997, catastrophic blazes produced smoke that affected southern Malaysia, Singapore, and much of western Indonesia, disrupting travel, driving away tourists, and undermining commerce. Air pollution from these fires was estimated to have affected 80 million people with a financial loss of over $1 billion dollars (
Note 28). The primary culprits were government-linked companies engaged in forest clearing in Sumatra and Kalimantan to prepare land for the establishment of palm oil and rubber plantations (Note 29). Loss of commercial timber is another result of the fires. The commercial plywood industry faces a shortfall of 14.5 million cubic meters of timber, or 30 percent of its demand, in part due to fires in production forest areas. Some analysts predict that fire-induced shortages will drive logging companies to overlog existing concessions and exploit protected forest areas (Note 30).Fire has always been an important element in managing the natural forest environments of Southeast Asia, especially in the drier ecosystems. Most long-rotation swidden farming systems rely on fire to clear fields, recycle nutrients, and manage pests. Most farmers, with the oversight of community institutions, carefully control such burns. In these contexts, fire has been used for generations as a means of managing the landscape in culturally prescribed ways. Unfortunately, documentation of indigenous systems of fire use and management is limited, vague, and judgmental. Some scientists are urging that a greater effort be made to understand the indigenous use of fire in collaboration with local communities (
Note 31).The incidence and extent of fire in the forests of Southeast Asia appears to have increased dramatically in recent decades with an expanding impact on forest ecosystems. There is evidence that forest fires in logged-over tropical rain forests result in a much higher mortality rate among the towering canopy trees because of the hotter temperatures generated by fuel build-up from the logging slash. The concentration of fire in logged sites and in areas being converted to commercial plantation crops raises serious questions regarding the sustainability of natural forests when they fall under the control of large, private sector interests. Analysis of bum patterns in Kalimantan during the fires of 1983, 1997 and 1998 indicate that the extensive fires were largely confined to areas being cleared for industrial tree crops, while areas under community control experienced much less burning.
Over the past several centuries the Southeast Asia forest resource base has been reduced by half, a loss of some 350 million hectares of some of the world's richest tropical rainforest. Some scientists estimate the loss of original habitat as high as 80 percent in Vietnam and the Philippines, and between 50 to 70 percent in Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. (
Note 32) The remaining half is under growing pressure and much of it is being disturbed. It is clear that commercial resource exploitation through logging and mining, as well as estate crop establishment has greatly contributed to the degradation of vast areas, both in terms of their ecological and productive functions. At the same time, over the past century, the role of communities in managing natural forests has been curtailed legally and administratively. A serious political commitment will be required from national leaders and international organizations if the community forest management paradigm to be meaningful empowered through legislative and operational actions throughout the region.
1 D. Lawrence, D. Peart, and M. Leighton, "The Impact of Shifting Cultivation on a Rainforest Landscape in West Kalimantan: Spatial and Temporal Dynamics," Landscape Ecology, 12:135-148, 1998. Cited in Jefferson Fox, "Mapping a Changing Landscape: Land Use, Land Cover, and Resource Tenure in Northeastern Cambodia," unpublished manuscript.
2 P. Dauvergne, Shadows in the Forest. Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997) p. 72.
3 D.A. Gilmour and R.J. Fisher, "Evolution in Community Forestry: Contesting Forest Resources," in Michael Victor, Chris Lang, and Jeffrey Bornemeier, Community Forestry at a Crossroads: Reflection and Future Directions in the Development of community Forestry, (Bangkok: RECOFTC, 1997).
4 This is from a published report by FAO, "Forestry for Local Community Development," FAO Forestry paper No. 7. (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1978).
6 Robert Cribb, "Contemporary Indonesia: Achievements and Dilemmas" (Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1998) P.11.
7 Lester Brown et al., Vital Signs, 1996 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996) pp. 122-123.
8 Daniel Bromley, "Property Relations and Economic Development: The Other Hand of Reform," World Development, Vol. 17, 1989.
9 Mark Poffenberger and Betsy McGean, Village Voices, Forest Choices (Oxford and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).
10 Carter Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutty, Toward an Environmental Strategy for Asia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993) Discussion Paper Number 224, pp. 122-123.
11 For more information, see Mark Poffenberger, Keepers of the Forest (Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1990); John B. Raintree, Land, Trees, and Tenure (Nairobi: ICRAF, 1987); Owen Lynch, "Philippine Law and Upland Tenure," in Man, Agriculture and the Tropical Forest: Change and Development in the Philippine Uplands (Bangkok: Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, 1986).
12 Steven W. Lawry, "Tenure Policy towards Common Property Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa," Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 30, Spring 1990.
13 Environment Investigation Agency, "Corporate Power, Corruption & the Destruction of the World's Forests," London: EIA, 1996, p.1
14 World Wildlife Fund, Bad Harvest (Gland: World Wildlife Fund, 1995).
15 Environmental Investigation Agency, p.7
18 Personal Communication from MOA staff, November 1999.
19 Environmental Investigation Agency, p. 29.
20 International Forest Science Consultancy, "Review of the European Community Tropical Forestry Sector Activities 1976-1990," 1991 cited in EIA, p. 4.
21 Food and Agriculture Organization, The State of Food and Agriculture, Rome: FAO, 1994.
22 Environment Investigation Agency, p. 2.
24 IUCN, "Metals from the Forests," Gland: IUCN, 1999, p. 10.
26 CIFOR, "The Indonesian Economic Crisis Implies Immense Changes in the Forest Sector," CIFOR Homepage, March 26, 1998, pp. 5-6.
30 William Sundarlin, "Between Danger and Opportunity: Indonesia's Forest in an Era of Economic Crisis and Political Change," unpublished manuscript, September 1998.
31 Jackson and Moore, 1998, p. 10
32 John MacKinnon and Kathy MacKinnon, Review of the Protected Areas System in the Indo-Malayan Realm (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 1986).