Atwood emphasizes that in a distorted environment, introduction of land titles may decrease equity and efficiency. Feder et al. find that in Thailand [...] output is 14 to 25 percent higher on titled land than on untitled land of equal quality. The market value is also much higher for titled land than for untitled land of similar quality. For Indian reservations in the US, characterized by the coexistence of different tenure arrangements, Anderson and Lueck find that output on tribal and individual trust land was lower by 85-90 and 30-40 percent, respectively, than on fee simple land. Less rigorous evidence is provided for Costa Rica by Salas et al., who estimate a positive relation of .53 between farm income and title security. Studies in Brazil and Ecuador also suggest a positive association between farm income and titles. But several studies have demonstrated that the credit market advantages of titles account for the lion’s share of their effects and that ownership security is not significantly correlated with titling. Titling may have no significant effect at all, when legal or customary rules limit land transactions and credit markets are weak.

High Infrastructure

0-5

514,828

403,044

324,662

5.1-10

206,783

186,912

160,934

10.1-15

98,660

82,505

79,185

Over 15

48,070

39,778

41,292

Overall

199,083

157,280

145,845

Low Infrastructure

0-5

403,702

323,641

232,162

5.1-10

143,304

124,935

102,878

10.1-15

45,338

43,494

43,352

Over 15

27,031

21,944

18,068

Overall

139,642

106,577

92,323

The following are the main risks and problems with land registration:

• Registration on a voluntary basis reaches only a diminishing minority due to a lack of information, the complexity of the process, centralized implementation and the resulting high cost.

• Registration merely offers specific groups more legal security. Entries as a person by the head of the family only serve to reinforce the power of the old compared to those possessing secondary rights such as the young and compared to women. A step-wise transfer of land (as a gift) while the family head is still living to the benefit of the older sons can only be realized with high costs.

• The formality of land registration is often out of sympathy with custom and tradition like the system of traditional inheritance (without the Land Registrar being notified) or secondary rights and thus giving rise to informal dealings.

• The access to strategic information on the procedures is asymmetrical. Those with management and legal experience or financially strong groups are more likely to use this to their advantage than are the rural landowners. This is due to the former being more familiar with the procedures and recognizing the long-term advantages of being entered in a land register through life in the city compared to people in villages in which no grave land conflicts have occurred so far.

• Registration will not solve the investment problems in agriculture if technology is unavailable or unadapted or if extension services are lacking.

• The costs for maintaining and controlling the efficiency of the land register are underestimated. Keeping registries up to date is difficult due to the inadequacy of the administration. In addition, those affected have not internalized the procedures, refrain from bringing the information up to date or they consciously avoid it in order to create a legal gray zone or to save land taxes.

• Correspondingly, legal uncertainty increases again when land is sold based on false entries in the land register.

• The standard hypothesis that only registered land affords security of credit is an estimation which is not critical enough since credit is not only dependent on land offered as security, but is based on the allover credibility of the lendee and often granted informally. This more likely requires stable social relationships between the lender and lendee than land security.

• The registration of land titles is a very insufficient prerequisite for promoting development in agriculture if parallel changes in further economic framework conditions are not also implemented (infrastructure development and labor mobility) (Kirk 1998a).

The forms of land registration can be divided into the "registration of titles" (including the "Torrens System") and "registration of deeds."

The "Torrens System" (named after its founder Sir Robert Torrens) is one of the best-known models for land registration (registration of titles). It was implemented the first time in South Australia in 1868. It basically applied the Prussian land register system as have many other countries. A main principle is that the legal title of a plot can be identified directly in the register so that no retrospective search is necessary using old documents to inspect the title. It is obligatory to register all land transactions in the Torrens System. It secures a governmental guarantee of this information in the register. Three principles are connected with the registration of titles:

• The mirror principle (the register faithfully reflects all facts which are material to title);

• The curtain principle (the register is the sole source);

• The insurance principle (an injured party will be compensated by the state, if the register has a flaw and fails to reflect the title correctly) (Palmer 1996:64).

The "registration of deeds" is based on the "deed" as the primary proof of rights of disposal. A rudimentary "registration of deeds" is a system in which the transfer documents (certificates) are kept in a public office (notary). "A deed is only executed when there is some change in the possession of a right and a register of deeds is a record of transactions in rights and not of the rights themselves." (FAO 1995:36).

In this system the quality of the documents is not inspected. Whether the (land) transfer documents are consistent with prior documents deposited in the register is also not examined. This system is widespread in Latin America, for example. The following are examples of the many possible improvements imaginable to this system:

• Quality controls of the received documents to ensure completeness of the register information.

• Index the documents based on parcels through the introduction of obvious parcel identification.

The registration of titles is based on a land register for proving property rights in contrast to the registration of deeds. With a registration of titles those currently possessing the legal title can be determined for a specific plot. This information is generally recorded in the land register through which the holder of the legal title can be identified.

Thus, the distinction between the two systems lies in the differing quality of the information. If improvements to information management are made for the registration of deeds (e.g. examination of the received documents), this system can hardly be distinguished from the registration of title. The difference between the two is mainly relevant for those countries living under British "common law."

Neither the registration of deeds nor the registration of titles copes adequately with the complex forms of autochthonous tenure. Indeed, those countries introducing land registration have tended to ignore the subtleties of autochthonous tenure giving rise to informal dealings in land taking place outside the register. Only recently improved methods of registration of autochthonous tenure are being applied (South Africa, Fiji).

The existence of reliable maps based on surveys including aerial photographs and an incontestable land register support planning initiatives in all areas having to do with "land." Land registration and the registration of secondary rights are fundamental for understanding (agrarian) structures and therefore also the planning basis for land use planning, measures for improving the agrarian structure, protection against floods, taxation, agricultural statistics or the regional and urban development.

Data base for planning

Despite the expenditure of millions of dollars to formalize property rights in developing countries in the past decades, success has been limited. In many cases, the access to credit was not improved after the land was registered.

The lacking security of land is often seen as a hindrance for credit awards to smallholders. However, registered legal titles are not sufficient for obtaining credit. Thus, legal systems can impede credit awards or collection thereof in the case of over-indebtedness. In India, the restrictions on collectors´ rights prevented the banks from awarding credit to smallholders. However, even when no legal limitations exist, banks are still hesitant to award credit to smallholders. In Peru, for example, 10,300 plots were registered up to 1995 in rural areas with the registration program RP (Registro Predial) and only 600 mortgages were taken up (Palmer 1996:136).

The hesitation on the part of the banks can be explained. In the case that the smallholder cannot pay back the credit, the credit security can often not be put in monetary terms. Clearing the family from the land cannot be realized in light of an active group solidarity. Even if it should happen, the neighbors can refuse to purchase the offered plots from the bank, thus the value of credit security rapidly sinks (for example, the Philippines and Kenya).

"Banks are reluctant to give credit to small farmers, even if they have registered title deeds, because they are considered high-risk producers.[...] Banks that do offer individual credits prefer medium-sized farmers (farmers with more than 20 hectares of irrigated land) with the ability to produce highly rentable cash crops (for example, asparagus for export).[...] When bank credit is available, it is minimal and usually given out through an intermediary such as an NGO. In addition, significant requirements other than registered title are imposed. It is clear that these credit lines are experimental in the sense that they are small loans given under very controlled circumstances. The loan period for most of the credit is equal to the number of months need to plant and harvest a crop.[...] Very little long-term credit for farm improvement or machinery is approved, and there is no credit available for the purchase of land."

Registration of land is undoubtedly an important factor for proving credit worthiness. Land can function as an object of security for the credit supplier. The following are further factors which may play a role in the awarding of credit:

• Income and income stability for paying back the loan,

• High transaction costs due to the awarding of many relatively small loans,

• Women are at a disadvantage with regard to credit access,

• Restrictions on the use of the loan.

These amongst other factors illustrate that registration of legal title alone is not sufficient for obtaining credit.

Communal systems constitute a special case. Communal land is not considered adequate collateral in formal credit systems because of constraints on sales to outsiders. Issuing individual titles in communities that maintain such constraints may improve neither the security of tenure nor access to credit, although individual titles would be helpful to avoid barriers to the emergence of rental markets within the community. Until the restrictions on transfers to outsiders are eliminated, a community title could be issued to ensure the community’s security of ownership against well-connected outsiders. Platteau advocates registering land as "corporate property" as a way of decreasing the costs associated with titling while reaping many related benefits such as insurance, flexibility of land allocation, and the utilization of genuine scale economies in subsidiary activities. Experience with group ranches in Kenya suggests that imposing group titles from above is unlikely to be successful, while issuing individual titles does not prevent farmers from taking advantage of scale where they exist.

Another case for community titles concerns common property resources, such as communal pastures, forests, or other marginal lands. Such areas constitute an important safety net for the poor that may be particularly important in high-risk environments where alternative means of insurance are unavailable. Community mechanisms for managing common property resources have tended to weaken with economic development, and privatization of such resources in India has led to significant increases in yields. But the preservation of common property resources could be desirable from an equity perspective since privatizing these lands takes away a part of the social safety net for the rural poor. Providing a community title for these lands can protect communal rights from outside encroachment and prevent the poor from being excluded from communal property.