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B. A Brief Overview of Land Policy in Mozambique FRELIMO's post-independence policies were forged from debates among its leadership concerning how best to govern rural zones of the country which it had liberated from Portuguese control and administration. Prior to independence, some members of FRELIMO feared the emergence of a capitalist class of landed elite. Two positions emerged. One side viewed the independence struggle primarily in nationalist terms and limited their agenda to one that sought simply to displace the Portuguese in positions of political and economic power. The second side adopted a more revolutionary program which placed greater emphasis on mobilizing the rural population. Such a strategy, it was hypothesized, would not only ensure rural support for the ongoing war for independence. It would also create a foundation which would enable the new regime, once independence was achieved, to gain control over the means of production and thereupon transform it. By the late 1960s, the revolutionary approach prevailed and the movement began to create collective farms in the liberated areas. This permitted Mozambican farmers to cultivate food to feed themselves and the FRELIMO fighters. After independence, these farms became models for the administration of rural areas throughout the country. In addition to providing presumed economic advantages, these farms also provided the government a powerful instrument of political control over rural Mozambicans. Shortly before and after independence many of the Portuguese settlers, including farmers, technicians, mechanics, transport operators, merchants and financiers, fled Mozambique, abandoning their farms and destroying much of the country's infrastructure. As a result, when FRELIMO took power it was confronted with an agricultural sector in near total collapse. The most productive farmland often situated in close proximity to transportation arteries, markets, irrigation schemes and rivers, and urban areas rapidly fell into disuse as it was abandoned. In response, the state adopted a two-pronged approach to agricultural development. First, in the absence of a Mozambican private sector to fill the void, the state was forced to "intervene" in the management of the greater part of the former colonial landholdings. These intervened farms became the nucleus of a massive state agricultural sector.[FN 9] Intervention on abandoned farms began in 1976 with a concentration on agricultural enterprises which were of critical importance to the Mozambican economy. Within five years, the government had formed state-farm blocks out of more than 2,000 abandoned commercial and settler farms. The state farm sector eventually claimed more than 200 state enterprises which were formally responsible for several million hectares. In 1991, the Land Tenure Center was able to identify only approximately 100 farms which continued to function, covering between 500,000 and 700,000 hectares. While this figure is considerably smaller than the earlier sum, it is important to point out that these farms nevertheless cover the most productive and economically strategic lands in the country.[FN 10] Second, in 1975 the government nationalized all land (see discussion below). Concurrent with the creation of collectivized farms, the government launched a massive villagization scheme, affecting at least 20 percent of the population country-wide, and forcing many smallholders from their own lands. Somewhat paradoxically these villages were often co-terminus with villages created under a similar program by the Portuguese colonial government. And like their colonial predecessors, these programs often engendered great hostility. The government re-affirmed its control over land rights in 1976 and 1987 with the Land Law and Land Regulations, respectively (see below). These programs state farm intervention, collectivized farms and villagization had a significant negative impact on productivity and natural resource management. Research conducted throughout the country indicates that these programs were extremely costly, unproductive and alienated a substantial proportion of the rural population. In particular, these programs created confusion and conflict among smallholders and between smallholders and other farmers more formally linked to state agricultural projects. They substantially eroded the strength of smallholder land rights, and more importantly, smallholders viewed the programs as a government "attack" which merely signified yet another round of land dispossession.[FN 11] Farmers saw little incentive to produce for commercial production and often retreated into subsistence production. At the same time, these programs encouraged poor resource management practices which led to severe ecological degradation is some areas of the country. As early as 1984 in the Fourth Congress Party FRELIMO publicly recognized a need to implement economic reforms, and particularly to shift emphasis in agricultural policy away from the state sector toward more "private" medium and smallholder enterprises. This was done because it was believed this would boost productivity at a time when the country was increasingly unable to feed itself and was without export earnings to purchase commodities. It was not until 1987, however, that the government implemented a structural adjustment program, PRE (Programa de Reabilitação Economica). This was followed by massive donor support for economic recovery, structural rehabilitation following the war, drought and famine relief, and demobilization of the armed parties leading to political liberalization and democratic elections. Significantly, structural adjustment compelled the government to review its key agricultural policies as well as forced the closure of many state farms (none of which had previously earned a profit). Unfortunately, while some limited discussion focused on dismantling the state agricultural sector and privatizing parts of it, [FN12] there was almost no discussion within the government about land use, administration or tenure. Laws were passed to facilitate alienation of state assets, but none of these specifically applied to land rights. Although some individuals within the government privately acknowledged that the land policy issue deserved attention, few officials were willing to publicly discuss such a politically contentious issue. The delicate cease-fire and the prospect of democratic elections appeared only to exacerbate this reticence between 1992 and 1994. And it must also be emphasized that many within the government continued to view land access and tenure security as unimportant issues. Indeed, in 1994 the Minister of Agriculture flatly stated that there was "no land problem in Mozambique." [FN 13] However, the absence of discussion about land policy reform as a policy issue by the government is in itself a choice with profound economic and political ramifications. Because the government was unwilling to resolve the emerging problems associated with unregulated and non-transparent divestiture processes, speculators began to acquire large land areas for little or no commensurate payment and conflicts quickly emerged. Accounts of land grabbing and related state corruption became common place as did rumors of corruption associated with the state. As a result, it is likely that at present, the hesitation of many government officials to meaningfully address land tenure reform has less to do with responding to the wishes of their constituents and more to do with the fact that the present system operates to their material advantage. In the period between 1992 and 1994 at least 20 million hectares of land has been "acquired" as concessions by private (non-smallholder) farmers or commercial interests, some of whom are highly placed government officials. These concessions have been made by different ministries (Agriculture, Mineral Resources, and Tourism), and at different levels of government (central, provincial and district). Concessions are being given for agricultural land, mineral exploration, hunting reserves, grazing, forestry and timber, and tourism zones at a rate that has increased substantially over the last two years. There is no indication that this trend is abating. These concessions often displace smallholders and other small private interests. In May 1992, the government formed an Ad Hoc Land Commission within the Ministry of Agriculture, but in the final analysis, it had neither substantive power nor meaningful institutional domain. Its term officially expired in May 1993 and it remained unclear whether it was officially renewed until 8 May 1995 when it was abolished and a Land Commission was established in its place.[FN 14] Throughout the critical transformation period between 1992 and elections in 1994 the Commission had one part-time director and one part time secretary, no supporting staff and no monetary resources. Following the March 1995 World Bank Consultative Group on Mozambique in Paris the Ministry of Agriculture moved forward with plans to restructure the Ad Hoc Land Commission and requested assistance from several donors and the Land Tenure Center to help with the development of a new land policy. Government, under the guidance of several technical advisors has moved forward with the creation of the new Land Commission and begun to develop a strategy for the review and development of a new land policy. Nonetheless, despite these trends the commission is staffed by a temporary director with no support staff or financial resources, and its meetings are not attended by staff from the other departments, directorates and ministries included in its new composition. This is disturbing given that the Ministry of Agriculture has suggested that it is possible to have a review of the land law and revisions of a new land law by the end of 1995. |