Michael Kirk (1996):
The Role of Land Tenure and Property Rights in Sustainable Resource Use: The Case of Benin

2.3. Problems and risks of cooperation

2.3.1. Village land use planning

a) Overestimating the capacities of committees for resource management

If the social relations and institutions within a community are already strongly eroded in the face of violent conflicts in the past or well advanced social and economic differentiation, then the committees come up quickly against their limits in dealing with conflicts. The same applies when conflicts are antagonised first and foremost by non-locals who only submit themselves to local rules very unwillingly. The founding of a committee can be hampered by this, and its work blocked from the start. Institutionalising as a long-term environmental set-up is hardly likely then. In Benin, these limitations could have a particular effect in the South (loss of social cohesion, stratification of society, influence from towns) and the conflict zones between agriculturalists and transhumant livestock keepers. External support of resource management on a self-help basis is afflicted with high risks.

Local committees have need of recognised local authorities. Projects favourise traditional leading personalities, and with democratisation, their influence is growing. Their position in relation to resource management has partially changed. They are no longer inevitably by themselves trustees of future generations and protectors of tenurial inheritance. They can perfectly well play a leading role in the sale of land. And on top of that, the way they see themselves as authorities and leaders does not necessarily fit a participatory, democratic approach which underlie the idea to promote these committees. In view of lacking alternatives, however, no program will be able to get around them, but a clarification of their vested interests in the early phase of the application of development cooperation can be of help.

There is a danger of blocking the work of committees which are formed from people of varying social status and rank. Especially between agriculturalists and livestock keepers, such differences are scarcely avoidable because of the differing hierarchies of their societies.

As local approaches are concerned, the conditions as to minimize these risk have to be specified. In South Benin a long-lasting success of committees is more probable if

• local authorities and their families still feel strongly attached to agriculture and village life (living in the village, employment pattern);

• local authorities personally have not been strongly involved in former quarrels and court cases on land (vested interests!) (Village histories concerning these sensible points can be depicted as A.Neef has proven in the South (Neef 1993);

• multiple employment and work migration do not play an important role in the village concerned (stratification, income differences);

• buyers of land move to the villages and start with local cultivation practices the basis of common interests is probably large. If absentee landlords dominate and new farming systems have been introduced (pineapple plantations) conflicting interests can be expected;

• villages are confronted with restitution problems of former State plantations, as they have a common opponent in negotiating.

In general, these criteria underline the importance of sound socio-economic informations at an early state of development cooperation, part of them can be carried out with Participatory Rural Appraisal in a cost-effective way.

The risk for committees to solve successfully conflicts between agriculturalists and mobile animal keepers can be reduced if

• minor and major national transhumance dominate compared to transnational as traditional social ties and economic relations are still stronger than with foreigners (Schleich et al. 1994);

• a successful cooperation of local committees with regional and national herders' associations can be established to coordinate patterns of pasture and water use with neighbouring districts.

In the case of resources for the management of which there are no evolved structures or historic models for consensus forming through committees or authorities, the prerequisites for the fostering of such organisations must be less favourably judged. That applies above all to the utilization of forest resources. The colonial power abruptly interrupted the institutionalised common regulations for forest utilization between agriculturalists, livestock keepers, hunters and gatherers of forest products with its policy of banning of all utilization. Thus individualistic strategies for every individual user group for the exploitation of the forest were fostered, united only because of the common enemy, the forest police. Weakened or interrupted communicating and negotiating can make the fostering of committees of forest users in the framework of the new forest policy more difficult.

Only a strong and continuous mid- and even long-term support of development projects (see C.2.2.2.a) will encourage the formation and daily work of committees of forest users and will trigger off communication and negotiating between involved actors. Risks are further reduced if locally working initiatives succeed to collaborate successfully with the administration at a regional and national level in order to control and limit large-scale wood exploitation by professional traders and charcoal producers.

b) Overestimating the willingness of the State to decentralise responsibility

There remains to clarify how much independence will be admitted to the committees by the State administration:

• Can the State accept the regulations which the committees give themselves for the practical work?

• Will it accept decisions (laying out of trespassing routes, utilization fees) which were unanimously decided, but which contradict the State's interests?

• How frequently will it dismiss decisions by referring to public interests and the safeguarding of internal security, and which repercussions has that for the acceptance of such (an ineffective) committee within local populations?

Thus the challenge for development cooperation also exists in particular in being able to secure local initiatives at all administrative levels with leading guide-lines and a constant flow of information from 'below' to 'above'. Thus legal security can be built up against capriciousness from above.

c) The mistrust of those involved in processes towards participatory approaches

An enormous danger for the fragile trust relationship between citizens and the State lies in the misuse of politically sensitive information by the Administration. Programs for the registration of the status of ownership (e.g. PGRN) are built up on strict participation and a voluntary nature. If the village declares itself ready to collaborate, the plans will be worked out and publicised by the Enquête Commission. Regional administrative bodies could misuse this information in order to drain a well developed tax source in times of grave financial emergency. As well, villages which are not registered by 'lotissement' could be imposed with a land tax. In the face of warnings from experts that extensive decentralising with financial sovereignty for the municipalities will have terrible financial bottle-neck as a consequence, it is by no means a case of theoretical considerations.

2.3.2. The urban area

A lack of will on the part of those responsible for a change of policy in the urban area oriented towards environmental goals, the high costs of measures such as in the case of the removal of environmental consequences and socio-economic conflicts for example, illegal settling could hinder the realisation of original objectives.

Consistent environmentally oriented planning becomes hindered by technical and organisational bottle-neck. Thus the project for an urban land register (RFU) has identified a relatively high percentage of landed properties with residential entitlement (permis d'habiter) for which no owner could be ascertained since an unannounced further sale was ongoing. Intentions for planning become delayed regulations become necessary for dealing with such cases. The experience thus far of forming interministerial work groups for the coordinating of sector comprehensive planning tasks are not encouraging and prevent an effective carrying out of planned reform work.

In the towns as well there exists in the future more than ever the danger that tax revenues and duties will not be spent for measures dealing with the environment, but rather with merely the bridging of the most pressing financial problems. Along with that, the instrument of land zoning is a two edged sword when municipalities place fiscal considerations before environmental demands and also consciously zoning out ecologically endangered locations in order to increase tax revenue.

2.3.3. The national level

External cooperation in the working out of fundamental laws of orientation for resource preservation in rural and urban areas can be impaired by the very diverse basic understanding of the functions of such a legal framework. The newest basic law such as the forest law of 1993 and the environmental law in draft form are also marked by colonial history. They are dominated by the demands for naming in detail, and taking care of all eventualities. Basic laws thus acquire the character of decrees and regulations and constrict the leeway for design.

The lack of will of the Administration can manifest itself the above, to relinquish a part of the State power in accordance with the subsidiary principle at lower levels, coming in closer proximity to the affected population and only in doubtful cases or the case of problems which overtaxes local competence to make decisions, to enter the plan.

2.3.4. Putting decentralisation into action

Should decentralisation by carried on, it will bring with it numerous frictions and transitional problems. The danger exists that the objectives of resource preservation through land tenure reforms will become subordinated to fiscal pressures. Municipalities must finance themselves through land taxes. The consequences for property relations, resource conflicts and sustainable utilization patterns will become subordinated to financial needs.

If common resources such as forests, hunting areas, etc. get transferred to regional administrative bodies, a greater need for coordination arises in order to put through uniform criteria for lasting utilization, exchange of information and conjointly administrate cross-community areas like forests.

Whether or not development cooperation can offer support here for long-term programs in view of the complex repercussions or rather more must take over only ad hoc functions for an overworked partner administration remains to be discussed.