Michael Kirk (1996):
The Role of Land Tenure and Property Rights in Sustainable Resource Use: The Case of Benin

4.3. Basic problems in cropping and animal production systems

The core problem of cropping and pastoral systems affect the transitional phase from common to individual ownership and result in inadequately precised rights to resources in Benin.

4.3.1. Legal insecurity concerning private ownership

The law for land registration which guarantees the exclusive private ownership of land, protected by the State and favours long-term investments which preserve and improve the soil, was only put into effect 796 times in the years 1982-1992. Only about 2% of the cases dealt with agriculturalists and plantation owners (Bio/Houngbo 1993). The law is unknown in rural areas. The cost of 215,000 FCFA is prohibitive for most landowners and the procedure is time consuming and thus far it has only been possible to carry out the procedure in Cotonou. Accordingly, all applicants are residents in Cotonou. Only 8% of all land registrations have been applied for in the strongly rural provinces of Atakora, Borgou and Zou

With the massive amounts of land sales, there is accordingly only a limited protection of private property. These sales are to be found in a transition zone between autochthonous and 'modern' State procedures: relatives and traditional authorities act as witnesses and carry on oral traditions; at the same time, written contracts dominate nowadays, more and more often with official confirmation. Step by step, the Benin territorial administration has promoted new land tenure norms and standards, also at the village level (written contracts, counter-signing). The courts recognise the practice, but only to a limited degree, for example at higher channels of appeal, or with expropriation in the interests of public welfare they are not accepted. For those involved, this discrepancy in the dealing of the State is scarcely comprehensible and creates uncertainty.

There exist an double information problem:

• The buyer is not aware that in usual contractual practice the State gives no final guaranty of protection of the acquired rights. In the case of a dispute, the buyer's rights are only incompletely protected.

• Non-local buyers do not profit from the public in dealing with property rights. In the local context, everyone knows about field borders, ownership rights of single families and the disputes over land thus far. It is all part of the public sphere. A stranger to the group can only judge with difficulty which disputed claims and conflicts he 'inherits' with purchase.

Local land registers as a source of information at the village or municipal level do not exist, and the land register of the State offers likewise no help. The cost of getting information by potential buyers is high and individual planning security is not settled until it has been explained as extensively as possible, who still claims to the property and what kind these claims are.

Investments in soil improving measures and fruit trees, palms or leguminosae are connected to a risk which would not arise in the case of an exclusive, clearly defined right of ownership. The PGRN is getting involved just here, and has the aim within the framework of its section 'utilization of water catchment areas' (aménagement bassin versant) of promoting a pilot scheme for a land register at village level open to the local public and thus creating planning security (see C.2.2.1.) (Karsenty 1993, Banque Mondiale 1992).

4.3.2. Uncertain usufructuary rights

The described uncertainty over rights and the hampering of investments appear aggravatedly in all forms of temporary surrender to the user of resources, be it the loan of land, all forms of tenancy or mortgaging land. Since these forms will gain in the future significance as regulating buffer institutions in particular in the South of the country, the results which arise from the uncertain rights to sustainable resource management are very significant.

• The duration of loans and leases are consciously not fixed; users are left in the dark about their planning horizons. Immigrants are more effected than locals, since the latter have more extensive social relationships at the village level, for them the cancellation of an oral contract is less probable. The young generation and women who only have secondary rights in comparison to the older or the male, are also disadvantaged.

• Tenancy, like sales, is still only lightly institutionalised in comparison to autochthonous land allocation, bequeathing and the loaning of land. The terms of renting out land vary strongly accordingly (level of rent, harvest share, repartition of input costs) and are frequently changed. Tenants frequently change their landlords and lasting social and economic relationships develop only very haltingly. Urban land owners who have acquired land for investment or for old age security lease land without sufficient knowledge of the local rules and market conditions. This also limits the planning security of tenants.

• Owners hold back land which they cannot farm themselves because of a lack of workers from people looking for land out of fear of a long-term illegal acquisition of said land (Karsenty 1992). The positive effect of fallow for the preservation of soil fertility can hardly be removed from the growing social tension as a result of inequitable access to land. Locally and regionally it can be that problems of destruction of resources are simply shifted from one location to another where it is not possible to impose this practice since social pressure forces a sharing of landed resources.

In future, all forms of temporary utilization of land through tenancy must be given at least the same attention in the national development planning as is given actually to the 'grey' land market outside the narrow legal framework. For fewer and fewer people in the highly populated South will live on and farm owned tracts of land. Appropriately, the incentives for the preservation of the natural resource stock under tenancy conditions are central.

As a result, two closely interwoven problems stand well in the foreground:

1. Land access must be guarantied to people seeking land within a framework of secured rules of tenancy.

2. The planting ban on trees and bushes limits the middle and long-term chances for the utilization for non-owners and makes more difficult the spread of agro-forestry systems (Neef/Heidhues 1993b).

4.3.3. Tree planting and ownership claims

With reducing fallow periods and only partial market integration, which limits the use of fertilizers, agro-forestry is of a fundamental significance for the preservation of soil fertility of a quasi-permanent cultivation system in Benin. Through the integration of trees and bushes, the soil is protected from erosion and excessive sunshine; leguminosae directly improve soil fertility; leaves can be used mulch material or animal fodder; the rapid growing demand for building material and above all fuelwood is taken into consideration (Grund 1993, Neef/Heidhues 1993b).

The scarcer the land, the more likely that annual plants and perennial crops can come into competition for land, nutrients and water. The difficulties of planting trees in the North where animal traction is wide-spread have already been addressed.

At the same time the tenurial significance of trees is more central than ever. Trees establish rights to land; their planting is seen more than ever as a sign for the legal confirmation land acquisition and land ownership (Gu Konu 1991, Loconon 1993). For Benin (and the majority of African countries) a graded consideration between self cultivation on owned land and rights of utilization on rented or loaned land tracts is urgent.

Self-cultivation on owned land: the land tenure prerequisites for an adoption of agro-forestry systems should be seen as positive in toto. There is a number of different incentives (Neef/Heidhues 1993b):

• For most individuals and families, private ownership of land can be described at present as relatively secure in contrast to the Marxist era and to tenancy, when disregarding the described latent problems of limits and property claims of a third person. Thus arises as well the security for long-term investment in trees.

• The efforts, also already in the North, to enclose and limit private ownership of land against the interests of land seekers. Independent of whether one is dealing with autochthonous access or land purchase, land plots are bordered and marked with fences, walls and also with hedges and trees (teak [Tectona grandis], neem [Antelaea azadirachta]) in order to raise the long-term security of ownership.

• Especially in the South, experiences are being made with agro-forestry systems: masses of owners are planting oil palms together with food crops as well as teak trees. It is possible that these systems are not in agreement with the systems propagated by agricultural research (such as alley cropping). But as a starting point the experience of peasants gained for generations should not be ignored.

• Differentiation according to farm size is necessary. Very big enterprises are most likely to be in the situation to be able to carry out traditional systems of extensive farming with long fallow periods for years to come. On small farms on the other hand, it is possible that fear of land being taken up by trees may hamper the willingness of farmers to integrate agro-forestry approaches.

Rented, loaned and mortgaged land: There is no representative research about the share of self cultivated and rented, loaned land or mortgaged land in the region. Case studies show that shares vary considerably (see table 3). In the South they are already of far greater significance than in the North. Neef/Heidhues cite case studies in which especially in the case of small farms in the Atlantique Province, cultivated land is leased or loaned in almost 70% of all cases (Neef/Heidhues 1993b:8, Tab.4). For these users, the prerequisites for the integration of agroforestry measures into their farming systems within the existing legal framework are unfavourable.

Greater incentives can only be reached through a change of behaviour on the part of landlords and tenants, in that they allow the planting of trees and guaranty longer renting periods, or through an appropriate participation in investing in trees or in that they agree on sufficient financial compensation at the termination of a rental contract.

4.3.4. Increase in conflicts between actors about scarce resources

Independent of the researched region, one can differentiate between the following patterns of conflict in relation to farm and pasture land, conflicts which have increased in connection with the ownership and utilization of resources:

• Between autochthonous agriculturalists within a village: points of conflict are a) drawing up borders between landed properties and b) the contesting of land sales.

• Between autochthonous and immigrant agriculturalists within a village: a) the tacit refusal to give land over to immigrants for utilization (pseudo-fallow land) and b) a stronger definition of rights of utilization in the case of renting-out and loaning land.

• Between agriculturalists and transhumant livestock owners within the environs of a village: a) delimitation of farming and pasture land, b) extension of farming activities and an encroachment to the disadvantage of herders (field enlargement, limited access to water points, hindering of trespassing rights) c) harvest damage through browsing and trampling d) utilization of crop residues and water. (Table 4 inthe appendix gives an overview of the bigger conflicts in the 1980s.)

The conflicts between settled and mobile livestock owners, for example over crop residues, and between peasants with and without stocks of animals may well be of a less explosive nature (for example, browsing damage from draught animals in the North and from smaller ruminants in the South).

Common to the named categories is that the local system of authority is already overtaxed in being asked to solve these disputes, and the State is being given an ever increasingly important role as actor in dealing with disputes without being able to do them justice.

4.3.5. Agriculturalists versus transhumant cattle keepers

Cattle stocks are concentrated in the North of Benin. At the end of the 80s, Borgou (58%) and Atakora (25%) Provinces held together 83% of the herds. Tensions and conflicts are increasing between the two groups. The fiercest disputes. however, are in the transition zone, in the Zou Province to be precise, which only has 11% of the animals, but is a favoured region of destination for transhumant herds (Bourgeot 1990, Sarniguet/Koudjou 1989).

The conditions which trigger off the change from common resource utilization and relationship of exchange to increased competition for natural resources are:

• The spread of land cultivated with food crops like yams through population growth and in particular in the planting of cotton through the use of draught animals.

• The uncoordinated and 'anarchic' spreading of fields on what was grazing land through 'fermes' and the establishment of new villages.

• The delimitation of State forests, national parks and protected areas since the end of the colonial period.

All these factors have a lasting impact on the mobility of livestock owners, requiring a permanent zigzag course for the herds, overtaxing the management capabilities of the herdsmen and thus endangering the basis of this extensive system.

The loss of potential grazing land goes hand in hand with the increasing cattle stocks in Benin:

• As a result of the transnational transhumance from the Sahel after the drought of 1984, which affected regions of Benin which had already reached their carrying capacity;

• Through the setting up of herds by the Peulh after the drought and the keeping of draught oxen by the farmers.

The social relations between both groups would have remained stable under the pressure of growing resource scarcity had not a sustained worsening of exchange relations, partially influenced by the above factors, taken place. The exchange of grain for milk reduced above all because the Peulh became settled and started to cultivate for themselves. The complementary relationship of cattle entrustment and fertilization of the fields by the animals decreased with the keeping of draught animals, the employment of paid herdsmen by farmers and the application of mineral fertilizer in cotton cultivation.

The institutionalised relations between the actors are changing accordingly with repercussions for sustained resource utilization: the way in which the customary rights of access -which pastures and fields are to be used when, by whom and for how long- also make clear the mutual relationships of power and dependence. They are by no means inviolable and static; rather they change with the relative strenght of both groups. The limitation of the right of way of herds and the more difficult access to water is seen by the Peulh as the calm, quiet, one-sided cancellation of a traditionally guarantied contract respecting their mutual interests (Bierschenk et al. 1987:109). Tried and proven institutional regulations are becoming obsolete since the mutual dependence which establishes them no longer exists.

State law in Benin offers no substitute to which the cattle keepers can turn. Quite the opposite: no coherent pasture law exists, for example within the framework of a 'code rural'; there are only fragmentary, isolated rulings, hardly laws, but rather if need be, decrees and regulations which vary from one district to the other. In the main they specify limitations upon utilization for livestock owners (Schleich et al. 1994a):

• regulations the utilization of crop residues,

• the determining of rights and corridors of passage for herds and sites to camp,

• regulation of water utilization.

In reference to nationwide laws, experience shows that the State is not present as an authority of appeal. Laws do indeed exist, but are not known locally or are not put into use. Local decrees are certainly put into effect by the State authorities, but as a rule in favour of peasants and to the detriment of livestock owners. Aggravated disputes arise because

a) autochthonous law becomes obsolete when limitations upon utilization, which are necessary to enforce customary laws cannot be kept to when resource restrictions and stock increases are concerned, or when there is no compulsion to negotiate anew or develop them further, since the reciprocal dependence of the parties is diminishing or is shifting to the detriment of the livestock owners.

b) State laws do not exist or

c) existing regulations do not get put into practice or they favour the peasants.

d) Agreements in the framework of the CEBV are not adapted to local ecological conditions and the economic rationality of the livestock owners.

4.3.6. On the interpendence of land tenure, resource protection and agricultural (research) policy

In all regions, cropping is based on fallow; the drop in its use has triggered off a many levelled institutional change in land tenure. Unspecified and uncertain tenurial conditions for fallow land aggravate the degradation of resources. The fallow will continue to decrease in quality and length with varying intensity in different regions with resulting diminishing soil fertility, yield depressions and weed infestation of fields (Floquet 1993). In hardly more than 10 years, permanent cultivation will be practised in the southern provinces (see table 5).

 

Table 5: Cultivated land as a percentage of arable land (in%)

Province	1990	2005
Atakora	13.3	23.4
Borgou	12.7	28.3
Zou	25.6	48.6
Mono	48.5	88.9
Atlantique	51.6	80.4
Ouémé	59.7	95.9
total	21.2	40.0

Source: Rép. du Bénin/MEHU 1993b:49

The drop in tree fallow accordingly reduces the sources in wood for construction and for fuelwood from the southern provinces (Bertrand 1993).

Individual households may well experience the agrarian crisis as a vicious circle comprising the reduction in fallow periods, the overuse of cultivated land, the loss of soil fertility and a drop in agricultural yields (Bertrand 1993). The social costs of environmental degradation are estimated at 10 to 20 billion FCFA. Out of this, 42% is apportioned to erosion damage, 17% to land clearing and the decrease of tree vegetation, 12% to the deterioration of soil fertility and 2% to bush fire (Reap. du Bénin/MEHU 1993). Thus the problems are concentrated at present to rural areas.

Just how far have agricultural and research policy already taken into account that in the near future permanent cultivation systems on tracts of land of only a few hectares with uncertain property rights and only limited integration of agroforestry elements will have to support masses of farming families? What is necessary are more intensive and at the same time sustainable forms of land utilization.

At present, the success of spreading technical innovations which have proved themselves on research stations to small farmers in the South has only been slight (Floquet 1990, 1993, Koudokpon 1992). Reasons amongst others are their lacking technical adaptability (use of draught animals in view of small farm size), too high costs for subsistence oriented systems (mineral fertilizers and plant protection) and the uniformity (improved mais varieties) of the innovations which does not do justice to the micro-ecological diversity of the existing farming systems. On the other hand, varied endogenous innovations of agriculturalists show that they are trying to get use to the scarcity of land and the required intensification.

Clearly defined property rights and security of investment are at best necessary but not sufficient prerequisites for resource preservation as long as no incentives exist to adopt the necessary agro-technical and organisational innovations.

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