Michael Kirk (1996):
Land Tenure Development and Divestiture in Lao P.D.R.

V. Land Conflicts and Conflict Resolution

Land conflicts are increasing in the Lao PDR. The reasons for this are very complex. The uprooting of the rural population, migration and resettlement as a result of the war, restitution claims of families returning to towns as well as to rural areas have a significant influence. To this is added a scarcity of land because of population growth, soil degradation or land conversion, as well as the demands of new interest groups for agricultural land, forests and water resources. They all act within the tense situation created by a new, only incompletely implemented and not yet generally accepted land legislation by broken down customary institutions as well as by inconsistencies in combination of both formal and customary land-tenure systems.

It is conspicuous in Laos that the attempt is made at all levels of conflict to satisfy parties in conflict over natural resources, first of all through negotiation and compromise. This ideal of harmony and balance is deeply rooted in the Buddhist tradition of the country. There are values and norms which, following suppression or toleration after the revolution, have been experiencing an extensive renaissance since the end of the 80's. Only when - following the principle of subsidiary- attempts at mediation at all levels have failed do conflicts get taken to court.

Reported conflicts actually include at the local village level:

• conflicts in villages between returning families and village inhabitants who have occupied their land. The impetus for this came from the breaking up of co-operatives and the return to the family household economy as the basic unit of production. After flight, uprooting and in part emigration, many of them are now reclaiming agricultural land abandoned in wartime (Hirsch et al. 1994:4).
• Such conflicts become aggravated when at this point, various ethnic groups, which harbor mistrust for one another and apply differing customary regulations for resolving conflicts, are confronted with one another through resettlement (e.g. the Hmong). More recently it has been government policy to encourage upland minorities to resettle in the lowlands so as to protect the forests endangered by shifting cultivation. Whether ethnicity per se is the basis for resource conflicts is doubtful (Hirsch et al. 1994:22), for ethnic differences can sometimes serve to highlight or exacerbate resource competition, but more often than not, the root of the problem lies in incompatible production systems.
• The scheduled resettlement to the fertile river valleys of families which fled to Thailand carried out by UNHCR and other organization aggravates the conflicts mentioned.
• Since landlessness is beginning to become a problem for families, conflicts in the future between the landless and landowners cannot be ruled out at the local level, especially if mature leasing systems are not able to create a balance. Squatting and high-handed land conversion on as large a scale as has so far been the case (shifting cultivation hidden in inaccessible forests) then also lead to conflicts between those directly affected, and between squatters and the State.

Generally, the capacity of the village authorities and committees in Laos for resolving conflicts is reckoned to be great. However, certain conflicts have remained hanging in the balance for many years; they smolder on, burdening social relationships, and poisoning the climate of the village. Case studies demonstrate that no-one dares to suggest and put solutions through, which, with the growing scarcity of land, now bring the relinquishment of claims, loss of access to resources and the forfeit of power with them. The same is true for conflicts between villages for rules are said to be difficult to enforce due to its reluctance to upset long-existing relations between communities. The autochthonous regulations push the limits here, "...it was often suggested that government regulations and assistance with enforcement might help to overcome such problems" (Hirsch et al.1994:21 f.)

With the application of the reformed resource legislation at the local level completely new conflicts arise which could not have been expected until now:

• Land and forest allocation at the community level relies very much on clearly defined boundaries. The lack so far of boundaries and the incipient demarcation of village land lead to conflicts between neighboring villages. While village committees are quite clear and consistent with their neighbors in identifying the natural features which serve as dividing lines, there are several areas of conflict. Growing land scarcity put the old boundaries in question. When conflicts arise, the District Administration tries to mediate.
• The earmarking of lowland and upland for agricultural use, village forests, protected and conservation forests, of production forest for logging and of biodiversity zones and incipient land use planning are a new experience for many villages. Redistributing property rights is the result of village interest groups being formed (animal holders, gatherers of production forests, and peasants who practice shifting cultivation). It is scarcely possible to achieve an uncontested allocation of land for different purposes, especially when former rights to common property are questioned and individualized. The officials from the DAFO and the District Land Office have a double function here: enforcement of the new legislation and arbitration in conflict cases. The procedures for conflict mediation are set down in Decree 169, Decree 186, in the "Decree on Village Administration" and the "Order on Customary Rights", but it is still too early to be able to estimate whether or not they are all practicable.
• When surveying land for registration for the purposes of levying land tax, new conflicts arise between landholders and the local administration (Land Office) thanks to false or inexact measurements. According to submissions from the officials involved, the local tools for reconciliation are sufficient for finding solutions acceptable to both sides.
• In the future, conflicts between men and women can be expected now that it has been become clear that men receive advantages from the Government. NGOs will support women in asserting their property and inheritance claims and will provide them with a forum.

Since the new implementation of the resource laws thus always has the effect of redefining and redistributing existing property rights, conflicts between local users and the State are in general unavoidable.

• However, as long as the power of the State is asserted with the top-down approach, partly because of improved knowledge and the situation of the interests of the villages, the State will continue to be regarded as an "intruder" and as a "predator". Its measures are either got around and sabotaged, or local DAFO and Land Officers, as well as foreign investors, whose interests the State represents in the conclusion of production forest contracts, regard themselves as a closed defense front against the village committees.
• Professional incompetence, a lack of information and the local administration's lack of good materials and personnel weaken their chances of arbitration.

Some of the conflicts between the local population and the intrusion of outsiders who either violate existing customary rights, or want to push through State laws which are not known or are not recognized locally are listed here:

• Wood cutting. There has always been a tendency for shifting cultivation by immigrant families (see above). Customary conflict solutions are, however, made increasingly difficult by scarcity of land, tense ethnic relations and the new legislation.
• The State cannot prevent the conflicts since the Forest Administration is equipped with poor personnel, and is unable to enforce existing laws. The dispute at the national level about whether there should be a separate forest police, or whether the police should also be responsible for forest offenses has not yet been concluded.
• A new area of conflict is to be found in the activities of the commercial logging companies which have to negotiate contracts with the villages for planting reforestation plantations according to Decree 169. If large plantations of over 1,000 ha. are planted, one has to assume that this area will be used in many different ways, and misunderstandings and conflicts of interest will always arise. The investors have a strong legal position here and know that the power of the State is behind them. However, they cannot enforce their position locally. Since the new legislation provides for extensive contractual rules, one must wait and see if conflicts will be defused by such negotiations and contract solutions. The demands of both sides are, of course, very high.
• Conflicts arise inevitably in the case of hydropower dams if compulsory resettlements are necessary, and the State and companies want to enforce them. The local population was always obedient under the control and command system (e.g. in the case of Nam Ngum), but with the assistance of international environmental and human rights groups, the conflicts surrounding the planned dam projects will doubtless become intensified. Clear regulations for (environmental) impact assessment and the allocation of responsibilities for this absolutely necessary.

A further area of conflict is the unresolved restitution of dispossessed land. The path of these conflicts is complicated as well:

• Dispossessed families demand their land back from the State, both in court and out of court. The demands are made more difficult when the property is valuable since high functionaries now often live in the houses, and each case becomes a political issue.
• Resolutions out of court attempted with negotiation and compromise in ad hoc land committees have so far proved to unsuccessful.
• New conflicts arise within the family because those who fled accuse those who remained of not having carried out their custodianship responsibly and of misappropriation..
• Conflicts the widely dispersed family clans about which strategies are to be used for restitution and the future use of the land. Of course, these last mentioned internal quarrels weaken this negotiating position vis-à-vis the State.

Thus all parties involved in Laos have tried so far to resolve conflicts at all levels outside the formal court system where possible, for it is well-known that the system does not always function as an independent third party, that judges are not yet properly trained, and that court cases cost a lot of time and money and that it is not foreseeable what the outcome will be. On the other hand, customary procedures of negotiation and arbitration are familiar. Thus, the system of conflict resolution needs further development. As markets are more formalized, procedures for resolving disputes over land will be needed. Clear procedures and guidelines are lacking at present, and increase the risks and uncertainty when entering into land contracts (World Bank 1994:68).

There are many promising approaches in the new resource legislation for diffusing conflicts: customary rights are being recognized for the first time (village forest use), and the active participation of the population is planned in the process of demarcation. In cases of conflict, a graded system of negotiation and arbitration is planned through various committees before cases go to court. Of course, there is the danger that this complex system will not be extensively implemented locally and the actors involved will thus be out of their depth. In such a case, the resource conflicts will come to a head.