Michael Kirk (1996):
Land Tenure Development and Divestiture in Lao P.D.R.

IV. Resource Tenure and the Role of Political and Economic Interest Groups

1. About the Dynamics of Interest Groups in Lao PDR

A multitude of interest groups [FN 80] also function in Laos, as they also do in neighboring Cambodia [FN 81] or in African countries in the process of transformation [FN 82] , with at times very different objectives as potentially important players in shaping the nature and the pace of reforms in the Lao PDR's land policy and administration. There can be no doubt that the distribution of property rights to natural resources in a society is closely interrelated to the power that these groups hold in their society (Birner 1996). One might distinguish between economic power and political power according to the means which provide the capacity for exercising power. Economic power can be conceptualized as bargaining power (for example, over logging quotas, conditions of hydropower dams, leasehold terms for forest land). Above and beyond this, one has to take into consideration power which is exercised by the abuse of property rights (enrichment through illegal acquirement of resource benefits, through extortion or blackmail) and the invasion into well-defined property rights (stealing someone's resources with the threat of violence). Political power is exercised by interest groups when they impose their objectives on other individuals or groups, also against the will of these individuals of groups, through skillful lobbying or economic pressure, e.g. in resource legislation.

It has become clear to all actors since 1989 that the forming of land tenure regimes will have profound political, social and economic consequences for different groups within and outside the country (Myers 1995:38). The various social, economic, regional, political and even ethnic backgrounds of potential domestic actors (party, military people, administration, smallholders (?), villages) have already been made just as clear in the previous chapter as has the current overwhelming influence of international actors (international capital, multilateral and bilateral donors, international NGO's). The analysis of the political economy of land tenure development and the dealings of stakeholders has begun in earnest in Laos, the data basis for this is minimal. [FN 83]

As can be observed in other countries in the process of transformation, dealing with so many factions and interest groups must be seen as both a blessing and a curse. [FN 84] The groups have been putting pressure on the government and central administration at various levels of intervention without a break since the end of the 80's. They are not only doing this to push through basic civil rights, division of power and the rule of law as guiding principles, but also to build up [FN 85] a consistent legal framework for land allocation and land management, and above all to place those immediately concerned at the center of their implementation through participation (from above). The most successful of all of these were the national and international pressure groups which made free product and factor markets as well as unhindered entrepreneurship and the strengthening of the private sector their uppermost objectives. NGOs have achieved a lot as lawyers for peasants, women, indigenous peoples or other ethnic minorities who were only able to articulate their own interests with difficulty. The discussion about customary rights, gender issues and biodiversity zones are the most important milestones here.

Forming a coalition between former powerful Party functionaries, the military and private investors must be critically judged, this being a coalition which has opened up rent-seeking opportunities and has increased competition for scarce resources. In addition, the mushrooming of interest groups has led to enormous internal co-ordination problems in a very short time. The result has been blockages, for instance in the process of legislation (Land, Forest, and Water Law) right up to the point of a stalemate. One would be underestimating the influence of the interest groups through lobbying or through threats of financial pressure if one were merely to call these delays in State dealings helpful information, consultation and opinion-forming process. In contrast, one can rarely rid oneself of the impression that the extensive interest group activities have turned the State, in particular the line ministries into dependent marionettes for their interests.