Julia Eckert, Georg Elwert (1996):
Land Tenure in Uzbekistan

6. Summary and Conclusions

The land question will play a part in several issues vital for the economic reforms in Uzbekistan: Agricultural investment and productivity, credit mobilisation, demographic development, water use and the ecological future, unemployment and last but not least potentially conflictive clientelist networks competing over scarce land.

The distribution of land in the course of the land reform is probably serving to increase subsistence production. The forms of land tenure created by the reform all lack independent responsibility and security of the owner, though. Therefore the development of successful commercial agricultural enterprises is inhibited: Crop-directives, state procurement at fixed price, the monopolistic structures created by unaffordable transport and inaccessible marketing place strict directives on the activities of the farmers. The farmer depends on the kokhozes for the distribution of land, for the use of technology, for the terms of his contract, for indispensable services. He depends on the Hokhim for the granting of a lease, the granting of credit and the granting of recourse to law, that is legal security.

Apart from the private farms, the organisation of the production has not seen many changes. A superficial implementation of the measures designed at central level distinguishes the reform. This is largely due to a lack of incentives to implement the reform at the level of the local administration.

Security and stability are the focus points of the policies of the Uzbek government. President Karimov and his government are aware of the conflict potential of the transformation process. The hesitant implementation of reforms aims at preventing a quick social polarisation and the uprooting of a large part of the population which could not be countered by a welfare system. It is part of an transformation strategy which insists on an "Uzbek way" and considers the consequences of the transition. [FN 166] Since they cannot, for certain, be determined, a cautious strategy is favoured.

These considerations also influence the design of the land reform. Many members of the ministries see the conflict potential inherent in the distribution of land. So far most violent clashes in the region, as the ones between Uzbeks and Meshkets or between Uzbeks and Kirghis in the Ferghana valley, but also the local causes of the war in Tajikistan have been about the allocation and control of land. The rural population is growing and land and water are scarce. As one member of the ministries said during the Discussion of the workshop: "We cannot privatise land. We have seen people take up arms for it." [FN 167] Regional disputes about the distribution of water and minor border disputes also carry a conflict potential. However, so far peace has prevailed.

In order to ensure lasting peace and stability the government opts for authoritarian rule and central control of the decision making. President Karimov justifies his style of government with the Central Asian tradition and mentality. [FN 168] Even if the Uzbek mentality would justify an authoritarian leader - an argument which is at least debatable - he would still face the danger of all centralised governments:
a> A misrepresentation of reality at the top of the hierarchy, and
b> an overload of information and decision-making in the hand of a few. This results in decisions being taken by bodies which are neither entitled nor monitored: If there are between 500 and 1000 cases of illegal land distribution a year, but the ministry responsible for investigating such breeches can handle only about 25 in that period, there is a large number of decisions which are taken in a authority vacuum.

At the same time, the information the government bases its planning on relies entirely upon one source: that of the local administration. [FN 169] They have direct access to information about the situation of the population and the development of the reforms as well as being responsible for the implementation of the directives from above. They are, therefore, the link between the government and reality. The real power moves to the middle level, that is the regional and local administration.

This signifies an uncontrolled "decentralisation" of decision making. In order to secure their decision making powers the local administration will only give on information favourable to their role. The central level will therefore usually have a misperception of the development s in the regions. (Special units, like a secret service will not create more information but rather an incentive for the middle level to develop further mechanisms to shield their monopoly over information and to protect themselves from control and punishment from above.)

In Uzbekistan, the local administration has so far little interest in the land reform. The measures suggested today only decrease the powers and control of the local administration. Therefore they have no incentive to implement them. Rather, they use the possibilities opened by the vagueness of the laws, the underinformation of the farmers, the lack of monitoring from the centre and the lack of separation of powers to implement the reform in a manner which enhances their position. The lack of separation of powers between executive and judicative makes recourse to law a matter of good connections, and create command state structures which diminish legal certainty.

The reform thus increases the dependency of the farmers on the Hokhimiat and the kolkhoz administration. Whether a farming family will belong to a new group of private farmers or tenants, or whether it will go the way of landless labourer, unemployment, proletarisation depends to a large part on the Hokhim and the chairman of the kolkhoz.

This rather overstressed picture will probably never look as bad since a> the administrations is able to present a picture of reform-minded actions and b> the farmers will only seldomly protest since there is no culture of open protest and little chance of it bringing betterment.

This process is a form of feudalisation aided by the developing monopolistic structures.

In a situation of a lack of separation of powers there is also a lack of legal security. People will then try to secure their rights through other means. Clientelism and patronage will be the central structures of social interaction.

Many argue that clientelism and nepotism are inherent to the Central Asian culture and that people do not know and do not miss other forms of legal certainty. However, clientelistic structures often inhibit the development of dynamic markets, of investment and, thus, economic progress which is, as many people expressed the precondition for lasting peace. Moreover, clientelistic structures often strengthen ethnic solidarity through ethnic nepotism.

Findings of the sociologists participating in the workshop also indicate the experience of a lack of individual security: Although only 3% of the population know the Koran, 70 % favour the introduction of the Sharia. The Sharia seems to serves as the utopia for a constitutional state. Despite the "tradition of clientelism" the legal uncertainty is apparently considered undesirable and a matter of individual insecurity. If the state cannot ensure its constitutional base, other associations in which "law governs" - be this the islamic community or the ethnic group - step in its place.

In this way the states centralised power hold is counterproductive. Only the rigorous introduction of separation of powers and of institutions of conflict resolution could create legal security. And only legal security can make other forms of "self-defence" unnecessary.