RS Eckert - Elwert (Uzbekistan): Chapter 4.2

Guiding Principles: Land Tenure in Development Cooperation
Orientierungsrahmen: Bodenrecht und Bodenordnung		Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Abt. 45 / Div. 45

Julia Eckert, Georg Elwert (1996):
Land Tenure in Uzbekistan

4.2 Nepotism, Corruption and legitimacy in the distribution of land.

On the local level, nepotism, patronage and corruption were generally accepted if they followed certain rules and did not exceed certain limits. (However, our sample cannot claim representative findings.) Within set hierarchies bribes, or rather: presents, invitations, assistance could be calculated as set costs of an interaction or service. They were seen as part of an interaction not as corruption. Every interaction has a social component and goes beyond the contractual agreement. Part of this was, that the interaction was fairly open: An invitation was visible to all village members even though not all could participate; even a new car seemed within the rules of decency in some cases. [FN 121] The attempt to conceal corrupt interactions aroused suspicion, though.

When corruption did not keep within a certain measure or if it was arbitrary or if it concerned people outside the set hierarchy it was considered indecent and illegal. Certain goods and services are expected to be equally accessible to all. If the corruption prices rise higher than what an average community member could afford and many are therefore excluded from access to those goods, criticism rises. Those who spoil the price, i.e. offer bribes beyond the price limit are severely criticised as well as those who accept indecent bribes. [FN 122] Similarly, if bribes are offered for goods which were so far free from additional corruption costs, it is considered a decadent change of customs, a corruption of social rules and justice. [FN 123]

The line between "decent" and "indecent" clientelism or corruption is drawn differently by different people, though. People who do not have connections with the right people assume that those sort of connections are due to money and bribery: You buy your good connections. People who have so-called "good connections" argue that they are family-friendships.

In one case a man from the city had promised his whole first harvest to the chairman of a kolkhoz in order to be allotted a plot. He was allotted the plot. The other farmers did not know whether he would have to pay his whole harvest for it. They criticised the size of the bribe which would be beyond their means. They also criticised that the chairman was "listening to strangers." [FN 124]

This case shows that corruption, even when it is considered to be "decent" or even legal, bears a dangerous potential: If rights are sold as services they become commodities and as commodities they are subject to market mechanisms. Thus the well-off have a much greater chance to obtain their rights.

As the criticism in this case implies, certain goods are "community property". If the people responsible for the distribution of "community property" privilege an outsider because of bribery, they endanger their legitimacy.

In one case village members complained that the chairmen of the kolkhoz, his family and relatives as well as members of the kolkhoz administration had appropriated waste land unofficially. They complained because they themselves had been denied private fields and applications for the founding of Dehkhans had generally been refused in this kolkhoz. The farmers had complained to the chairman but he had not reacted. They then had written to the Hokhim. The Hokhim had send an commission for investigation, but the farmers never had the chance to talk to the commission because the chairman had prevented the commission from seeing the farmers and had given presents to them.

The farmers gave up their struggle and did not go to court. First, they said, the members of the kolkhoz administration were related to them and one could not go to court against a relative. Secondly they did not believe that the court would be more accessible than the commission from the Hokhimiat. [FN 125]

The chairman of the kolkhoz undermined his legitimacy and authority by unjustly distributing land. The farmers verbally did not tolerate impositions on their farming activities anymore although in practice they still had to comply with them. They also criticised every case of bribery or nepotism. The chairman was not considered an able leader anymore but as an illegitimate boss. "Before, he was a good leader. He always took the right decisions and we were a rich kolkhoz. Today he does not care for the kolkhoz anymore. He only cares for his own wealth. He should be dismissed. We need a good leader in these difficult times. But these things are decided by the Hokhim, and he doesn't know that the chairman is bad nowadays." [FN 126]

In this case people did not tolerate the privileges of superiors because the chairman did not observe the rules connected with his position. While superiors are granted privileges, they also have to fulfil the expectations of their subordinates as to fairness and working in the interest of all. Working for their own interest is legitimate as long as the interests of the community are not infringed upon.

In one case a Korean kolkhoz chairman received a present of 20 television sets from South Korea. The sets were meant for the kolkhoz. But the chairman used all of them to bribe officials. Therefore he did not comply with role of a kolkhoz chairman according to the the expectations of the kolkhoz members and his bribery was heavily criticised. He was also suspected to be biased towards Koreans. Apparently he had favoured his relatives and some of them had also received television sets, although most had gone to ethnically Uzbek officials. Usually it would be expected of every good man to "look after" his family and relatives and nobody would object to nepotism. In this case, though, an ethnic component of alienation or mistrust came into play either because the legitimacy of the chairman was impaired, or because "ethnic others" are judged more strictly. [FN 127]

Disputes about the distribution of land through nepotism or corruption, were, in the end disputes about legitimacy. This is why the people offering bribes and paying corruption were not criticised as much as the ones accepting the bribes. They abused their position of power and were corruptible. Thus their legitimacy was impaired.

It was noticeable that we found criticism and complaint stirring only in former sovkhozes and kolkhozes close to cities especially close to Tashkent. They all showed the same distinguishing features:
a> they were close to a city;
b> they were "new settlements" as opposed to old villages; and
c> they had administrative authorities which did not have a hereditary or traditional legitimisation.[FN 128]
In areas of high continuity, in which the Soviet agricultural units only encompassed pre-existing villages etc. we recorded no criticism. Even in new settlements where traditional local leaders had been integrated in the Soviet hierarchy social cohesion was high. In these settings of social continuity the rules governing corruption and patronage might be more clearly defined and more strictly observed. Social control is more effective and will inhibit excess of power as well as criticism of it. The fact that we did not encounter criticism in these places therefore might be explained either by corruption or abuse of power actually occurring less often, or by it not being criticised as openly.

In areas where traditional and Soviet hierarchies did not overlap but existed side by side, or in resettlement areas there was much more dissent. Since power in those areas was based less on legitimacy than on control of resources and means of coercion, it was likewise not as important to protect ones reputation and legitimacy and comply with the rules. "Venality" [FN 129] expands where social control/moral has less significance: In those settings, violating the rules of "decent" corruption do not have as much an impact on ones social standing and therefore venality becomes more profitable than decency.

Further research is needed to examine the changes in the rules of corruption and in its practices brought about by the transformation process.