Julia Eckert, Georg Elwert (1996):
Land Tenure in Uzbekistan

2.3 The shareholdings

Many kolkhozes or large parts of them have been transformed into shareholdings. Shares are distributed and have to be paid off within ten years. The fixing of a price for the shares posed a problem and was, in the end, determined arbitrarily; it did not take into account a projected market value or profit. Since the system had just been introduced there was no experience in the distribution of the profit. The shareholders are supposed to share in the profit at the end of the year according to the amount of shares they hold. Additionally they would be paid a monthly wage of 300 Sum. (In one case workers were paid 1000 - 1500 Sum, which is comparatively a very high salary.)

In 72 % of our cases shares had been distributed to all the former kolkhoz workers. In 14 % of the cases collectives within the kolkhoz distributed the shares to those worthy of it, i.e. hardworking members of the kolkhoz. "Lazy" members or drunkards did not get shares. (See chapter on V.4 on ethnic relations.) They would be employed for certain tasks at a certain rate and would not share in the profit at the end of the year. In 7 % of the cases the amount of shares given to a single worker was determined by his years of service. In the other cases they were given according to family size, i.e. need, or according to what the collective and the worker estimated he or she could pay off within ten years.

There were plans to give out 30 % of the shares to non-kolkhoz members, but this had not been done yet. In most cases it was expected that the non-members would join the work on the kolkhoz; only in 14 % of the cases external shareholders were seen as mere investors.

Whether the shareholdings will be successful and constitute a significant progress to the kolkhozes cannot yet be estimated. Members of the ministries themselves suggested a quick transformation of the shareholdings into private farms. Their structure and organisation of the production process still resembles that of the former sovkhozes and kolkhozes. Many of the workers knew that they had received a piece of paper and were now officially shareholders, but they said nothing had changed for their work or decision making and they continued to call their place of work the kolkhoz. The work in the shareholdings is still divided between brigades. The chairman of the kolkhoz, now chairman of the shareholding, will design the production plan together with the various experts. Since the state now has less influence on the production plan as well as on the spending of the profit, the chairmen of the shareholdings, who have frequently inherited their position from their fathers, treat the new economic entities as their property and combine the position of owner and chief manager. In some cases this leads to an efficient organisation. In other cases it leads to the kolkhoz being the sinecure of the chairmen, their families and the administration. This means that kolkhoz assets are used to pay personal bribes; [FN 60] that kolkhoz land is distributed to relatives and friends; [FN 61] that kolkhoz contracts are made for the personal profit of the administration or parts of it. [FN 62] The farmers become the Golden Goose, without the chairmen realising that they actually inhibit an increase in production by deriving the farmers of incentive and of capital.

Whether the chairman acts as a manager or as a prebendary seems to depend on their personality as well as their age. Younger chairmen seemed to see future prospects in incorporating themselves in new capitalist working culture and furthering their hereditary legitimisation as chairman by successfully adjusting the enterprise to the new system. Older chairmen seemed to be interested in securing their sinecure. They have little interest in a change of the system, since the reform - as they see it - offers them only a reduction in power. Seniority is an important factor in the uzbek social hierarchy, therefore the silent objection to the reform by many elder leaders poses problems to the success of the reform. (See chapter 4.1 on Dispute settlement)