John W. Bruce, Mark S. Freudenberger and Tidiane Ngaido (1995):
Old Wine in New Bottles:

4.2 Creating institutions for conflict resolution

In Niger, the main approach in implementing laws and resolving land disputes has been for any land law or government decision to create a structure that mandates implementation of the terms described in these policies. For example, the proclamation of the 12 March 1962 law (Loi 62-7), which suppressed chieftaincy lands (terres de chefferie) and abolished tithe payment on these lands, was followed by the 29 May 1962 decree, [FN 13] in which the Diori government created commissions to determine the terres de chefferie and the farmers cultivating those lands. The commission included state representatives (chiefs of circonscription and the head of the land board service), elected officials (deputés), and traditional village and canton chiefs (Sidikou 1982). However, the integration of traditional leaders into the state political party (RDA) blocked the effectiveness of these commissions and enabled chiefs to assert ownership over these lands (Charlick 1991; Mariko 1985; Ngaido 1993a, 1993b). Therefore, until 1975, land disputes were resolved by the Juge de paix, who held weekly court sessions in villages.

On 28 January 1975, the military regime devolved responsibility for conflict resolution to customary and administrative authorities to reduce lengthy court deliberations. [FN 13] This devolution failed because of contradictory interests of administrative and customary authorities. Customary authorities perceived this measure as a means to restore their social position and regain control, whereas administrative authorities (prefects, subprefects, and Chef de Poste Administratif) had to implement the "land to the tiller" policy. Consequently, this fostered more problems as reconciliated disputes were repeatedly brought back for revision after the appointment of any new subprefect. The possibilities of revising reconciliation made by their predecessors and by customary authorities affected negatively the effectiveness of the devolution. Hence, the military regime took two measures. First, they restrained local administrative and customary authorities from involvement in the resolution of any land dispute, and, second, they created the "Development Society" [FN 14] that was to replace existing social institutions (Charlick 1991). Local committees of development and village committees of development were created, respectively, at the canton and village levels. Their mandates were to participate in the formulation of local development policies, manage resources, and resolve land-use conflicts.

Following the 18 June 1987 decree, which regulates circulation of livestock and defines grazing rights, commissions were created at the arrondissement level to resolve conflicts between herders and farmers. The 1 July 1987 Arrêté [FN 15] determined three levels of conflict resolution: village or tribe, canton, and arrondissement. The commissions at village and canton levels, which included local institutions of the Société de Développement and local government technicians, were chaired by village, tribe, or canton chief. At the arrondissement level, the commission, which included all commune or arrondissement institutions, was chaired by the mayor or the subprefect. [FN 16] The role of these commissions extended from conflict resolution between herders and farmers to include all tenure conflicts.

1. The commissions created by the different Nigerien regimes to address land tenure issues were limited in their effectiveness because:
2. Commissions were composed of the same people who had the primary vested interests, that is, traditional chiefs and members of the aristocratic families.
3. Most of the conflicts resolved by these commissions were challenged over time as soon as a new subprefect was appointed.
4. The reconciliation that was reached was not always signed by all parties, which reduces their legal effectiveness. For example, in the arrondissement of Mirriah, most of the cases resolved by the commission were not signed by all parties.

The resolution of conflicts between herders and farmers over grazing areas and corridors rarely led to the eviction of the farmers because village and canton chiefs delayed execution of the judgment until the following year on the grounds that growing crops must be protected. The following year, the same practice was used by the farmers. The farmers’ ability to avoid eviction fostered animosity between herders and farmers.

Conflicts over ownership were resolved by the "land to the tiller" policy and by swearing an oath on the Koran. The former favored use-right or tenant farmers, whereas the latter favored landowners. The problem of use right holders and tenant farmers was that they were not sure that government measures, which granted them ownership, allowed them to swear an oath. The application of these two approaches to resolve conflict was different from region to region. For example, the Zarma rarely have recourse to swearing whereas, among the Haoussa of the Zinder region, swearing was the main mean of conflict resolution.