Achim Blume (1996): Land Tenure in Rural Zimbabwe

3.1 The Current Controversy Surrounding the Resettlement Program

The new program has so far had little success since the constitutionality of the Land Acquisition Act has been under open debate for a number of years, and since the government continues to proceed very hesitantly in practice. The small amount of resettlement undertaken in the Nineties related only to land which the State had acquired before the Land Acquisition Act was passed, on the basis of the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle before 1990. Not a single land-holding designated for nationalisation and compulsorily purchased under the new Act has yet been handed over to the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) for resettlement.

Even before the Land Acquisition Act had been passed, the seeds of the political and legal debate about its legality had already been sown by the very negative stance of the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), the group representing the interests of the large-scale white farmers. The CFU regarded the new form of compulsory purchase or nationalisation, which no longer granted any individual right of appeal to expropriated parties, as an infringement of the protection of property rights incorporated in the Constitution. In general terms the CFU is not opposed to a redistribution of land, but believes that the acquisition of land on the basis of the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle is more appropriate and more just. Where resettlement is carried out on this basis, the CFU is even prepared to cooperate with the government.

By energetic lobbying of the major donor countries and organisations the CFU used political means to attempt to bring about a change in government policy. One statement which should be seen in this context was Douglas Hurd’s comment when he was the British Foreign Secretary, that "The land reform proposals would have rather ‘deep implications’ for Zimbabwe’s prospects for raising foreign funding". However, the lobbying was not successful because the government, having an eye to its own electorate, continued to push through a change in the law. Thereafter the CFU tried to prevent the bill from being passed by initiating individual court actions against it. President Mugabe responded to this challenge by announcing publicly that the government would not tolerate a court ruling which rendered the proposed form of land nationalisation illegal. In the 1993/94 national budget Z$21.2m (US$3.3 m) was earmarked for the proposed nationalisation of 70 farms covering 190,000 ha. Mr Mugabe also criticised the governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and the USA for allegedly opposing the new land reform in the interests of the white farmers. He warned the CFU that the farms might be confiscated without any compensation if it continued to lobby.

However, hardly had the difficulties with foreign donors, and, to an extent, with the CFU, seemed to subside in early 1994, when the government was rocked by a lease scandal in the context of land reform. Indeed, the press treated this as a corruption scandal. The problems began when it was disclosed that Mr Magwende, the Minister of Education, who had previously, as Minister of Agriculture, been primarily responsible for the enactment of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, had been granted a lease over 1,200 ha. of what had formerly been "white" farmland for a minimal charge. The farm had originally been intended for the resettlement of 33 landless farmers’ families. The scandal spread when it became known that a total of 98 former "white farms", compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, had been leased to senior officials, often for small amounts of money.

In order to retain his political credibility President Mugabe revoked all new leases in April 1994 after Mr Kangai, his Minister of Agriculture, failed to convince the public that the land had been allocated on a proper basis using a racially-oriented line of justification. At first this political step also led to great uncertainty for large-scale and small-scale commercial farms operated on older long-term state leases, which only proved after some delay to have been unaffected by the revocation measure.

Unlike this wave of political scandals, the legal debate on the constitutionality of the Land Acquisition Act was to drag on for several years. There had already been intense academic and political debate since 1992, but it was not until mid-1994 that the High Court was required to rule on the issue when dealing with an action brought by three large-scale white farmers. A judgement was reached on the action in November 1994. The ruling stated that the designation and nationalisation of land under the Land Acquisition Act was constitutional and also consistent with the general interpretation of the applicable Roman Dutch Law.

The essence of the legal case was the plaintiffs’ position that even before the expropriation itself the designation of a farm for nationalisation constituted a curtailment of property rights for which the Land Acquisition Act (part IV) did not allow any entitlement to additional compensation. The Act only provides for compensation to be paid in respect of the expropriation itself. However, according to the plaintiffs this was an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of compensation associated with compulsory acquisition: the Constitution both commits the State to pay appropriate compensation and guarantees the individual’s right thereto. Many observers therefore expected this view to be confirmed by the High Court of Zimbabwe. However, the High Court did not consider the designation of farms for expropriation pursuant to Part IV of the Land Acquisition Act to be unconstitutional, or that compensation should have to be paid against the impact of that designation. According to the court the designation of a farm did not have adverse effects on the owner’s use thereof.

The High Court concluded that the implementation of the Resettlement Program was an activity in the public interest in terms of the Constitution; this was the basis from which the legitimacy and also the legality of the expropriation process under the Land Acquisition Act were derived.

Whether the government will actually make use of this increased leeway to implement the promised Resettlement Program is still unclear. The recently increasing demand from the black elite for large-scale farms reflected, for example, in the lease scandal at the beginning of 1994, is of political and economic importance. Given the involvement of these groups in government decision-making it has to be assumed that important decisions on the implementation of the Resettlement Program could be delayed or even impeded by taking account of special interests. As Mr McSporran, the President of the CFU, reported in October 1994, about 20% of the large-scale farmers are now black and more than half of the cabinet members have now joined the CFU. The economic power of the large-scale white farmers in combination with their new African colleagues could also be a major political factor.

Observers agree increasingly that the lack of political will on the one hand, and also the lack of specialist knowledge and resources on the other, will make it difficult to implement the planned second phase of the Program. In the government’s 1994/95 Finance Bill only Z$26m (US$3.11m) was set aside for land acquisition. This is only 1% of the amount which would have been required for the proposed resettlement of 5m ha., even if the government were only to pay one third of the market price in compensation.

Meanwhile experts and political observers believe that the political rhetoric surrounding the Resettlement Program, which has also adversely affected the investment perspectives of individual farmers, will come to an end following the forthcoming elections in the first half of 1995. This belief is supported by the Public Service Commission’s proposals to wind up the Department of Rural Development which is responsible for implementing the Program. The merger of DERUDE with the District Development Fund (DDF) and other departments which was briefly discussed by the government was rejected by the President’s Office in September 1994. Owing to a requirement to cut staff costs DERUDE is also believed to have lost its most able members of staff. Only a few experts now believe that DERUDE will continue to exist long-term after the elections. The department’s few remaining activities will probably concentrate on resettlement on land which has already been nationalised.

Nevertheless, this forecast trend is contrary to the strategy of the farmers’ representative group in the SSCAs and the CAs, the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU), whose political importance has grown substantially over the last few years, not least because of its charismatic president Mr Makazire. In its policy document the ZFU calls for the Resettlement Program to be implemented as planned and also makes detailed proposals to improve the net economic performance of the Resettlement Areas (cf. extract from the policy paper in Appendix 3.1). However, the ZFU is not out to become the champion of marginalised groups, but is pinning its hopes in particular on the productive resources of the medium-scale farmers. Following the merger agreed in 1991 between the Zimbabwe National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU), the association representing the SSCAs farmers, and the National Farmers’ Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ), the association of the CAs farmers, ZNFU officials came to occupy many of the key positions within the ZFU as exemplified by Mr Makazire’s appointment to the presidency. If the ZFU were, unexpectedly, to be successful in reviving resettlement policy in Zimbabwe thanks to its strong commitment, this reform would certainly have no direct beneficial effects on the groups which are marginalised and socially deprived. At best, they would only benefit from secondary effects.

The further development of the Resettlement Program in Zimbabwe and the disappointing results to date are particularly important for efforts to implement land reform in Namibia which has a similar system of land tenure. Here, over four years after Independence, the land reform promised by the government has yet to materialise. About 4,500 white farmers continue to own more than three quarters of the farmable land. The black population accounts for about 95% of Namibia’s 1.5 million inhabitants, but has only about one quarter of the land. However, the government has not so far acted very consistently on land reform. The Swapo government had allocated US$5,700 per family for the promised land and settlement reform, but so far only US$28.5m have been made available. Farms which are owned by foreigners are generally excluded from the redistribution so as not to deter foreign investment. Mr Kabanji, the minister responsible for land matters, does believe that land was taken unlawfully from the black Africans in the colonial period, but also that two wrongs do not make a right.

In line with the position in Zimbabwe in the Eighties, the resettlement programme in Namibia now appears to be trailing behind its schedule, which may make economic sense in terms of investment and production, yet which harbours the risk of major socio-political conflict. Even now, discontent about this delay is clearly on the increase in the expanding city slums. In Zimbabwe President Mugabe, who enjoys a high level of confidence among the Zimbabwean people, has so far always been able to defuse potential conflict. In Namibia, on the other hand, the situation is quite different and government representatives have already warned that emotions are running high. The subject of land reform is so sensitive that it might lead to a new civil war. Even Minister Kabanji said recently, "This country could still rapidly revert to the position it was in before the ending of hostilities in 1989".

With regard to reform efforts in Zimbabwe and Namibia, it would be helpful to review systematically the experience gained and lessons to be learned from the Zimbabwean Resettlement Program, concentrating especially on aspects of political implementation. As this brief analysis of the Resettlement Program has shown, the influence of particularised interests has so far been a heavily neglected aspect in the implementation planning of reform measures. They essentially determine the course, speed and direction of a reform process. A more precise analysis of the interest groups, of their objectives in exercising political influence and the means by which they do so, and of the interaction between various groups within the reform process, should be carried out. Such a study could be used, on the one hand, to draw important conclusions about future strategy for the implementation of land reform in Namibia and Zimbabwe and, on the other hand, to provide valuable information for the GTZ sector project. The aim of the sector project is to develop and describe, within an orientational framework, instruments and methods which improve the consideration given to land tenure issues in relevant development cooperation projects. Both this analysis and the practical use of the instruments will require a basic understanding of the rationality, activities and responses of the groups involved.

In addition to providing this analysis, the study should also aim to develop methods and instruments to ensure that the activities of the interest groups involved are taken into account in a better and more appropriate way by state implementation planning. At the same time it is important not only to develop a set of reactive instruments, but also, if possible, a pro-active concept of conflict management. For example, the study could examine whether it might be beneficial to redirect conflict by involving various groups at an early stage in the state planning process. By appointing representatives of various groups to the Land Tenure Commission, the Zimbabwean government has already started to go down this road in its endeavours to draw up a new national land policy.