Guiding Principles:
Land Tenure in Development Cooperation

gtz_s.gif (1630 Byte)

Orientierungsrahmen:
Bodenrecht und Bodenordnung

Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Technische Zusammenarbeit
Abt. 45 / Div. 45

 

Achim Blume (1996): Land Tenure in Rural Zimbabwe

2.3.3 The Government’s Response

The government’s response to the experience gained from the Resettlement Program bears the stamp of political pragmatism.

Since the early Nineties when the Structural Adjustment Programme and the associated extensive liberalisation came to an end, the scope for providing support through agricultural policy and, specifically, through marketing, pricing and credit policies has been very limited. This argument has created a defence which the government can easily fall back on if progress proves disappointing on the agricultural front. A special study to identify and consider the opportunities which do still exist despite the difficult environment could provide more detailed information on this.

As regards land tenure, there has been more discussion since the early Nineties on how to make the institutional framework and hence also the system of individual incentives more efficient. For example, it was proposed that a rolling, inheritable leasehold system be introduced, combined with a land tax or a lease rental. It was also proposed that individual private property rights be granted. To date these proposals have yet to be translated into action and this is not likely to happen until a new national land policy, currently at the discussion stage, is introduced. This is considered in section 4.2.

To demonstrate that the government is nevertheless willing to act, the Minister of Agriculture announced a new programme in June 1990, which can be termed the second phase of the Resettlement Program. The new quantitative target provides for the acquisition of 6.5m ha. of land from the LSCAs of which 6m ha. are intended for redistribution under the Resettlement Program and 500,000 ha. to expand the State agricultural sector.

Ten years after the Lancaster House Agreement the opportunity was taken to support the Program by lifting a number of restrictive measures which were said to have had an adverse effect on the rate of redistribution. As a first step the protection of property rights written into the Constitution was qualified in relation to expropriation for resettlement purposes by the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill No.11. As a second step the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, which finally abolished the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle, was passed by the government. As a result of this legislation the State authorities responsible for expropriation were given much greater powers, which also covered the selection of large-scale farms. The compensation provisions were also changed so that the government no longer had to enter into lengthy price negotiations with vendors. Under the new legislation, the government is itself able to determine a fair price for the farm designated for compulsory purchase and the vendor may no longer appeal to the courts against this price.

Since the Act was passed it has formed the focus of intense political and legal discussion, thus acting as a surrogate for the entire Resettlement Program. To date therefore the new program has also produced little in the way of results. The discussion regarding the Land Acquisition Act and the debate which also began in 1992 about the system of land tenure within the individual agrarian subsectors will be outlined in the next section.