Achim Blume (1996): Land Tenure in Rural Zimbabwe

2.3.2 Principal Problems

One of the principal problems of the Resettlement Program to date has been that the planned scale of resettlement could not be achieved. The government believed this was essentially due to the procedure for acquiring land laid down by the Constitution (the principle of willing buyer, willing seller). However, in the opinion of most experts the modest scale of the resettlement had various causes, deriving from the combination of limited land supply, limited financial resources on the demand side (on the part of the State) and administrative bottlenecks within the institutions involved. The 1985 Land Appropriation Act (see below), which was an attempt by the government to increase the Program’s effectiveness, also failed to meet expectations. As a consequence the principal aim of the land reform, the reduction of rapidly growing population pressure in the CAs, was not achieved. As outlined above, the population of the CAs increased from about 5 m in 1980 to about 7 m in 1990.

The World Bank’s view, however, was that the Resettlement Program’s principal problem was not so much the modest scale of resettlement achieved, but rather the disappointing agricultural output in the Resettlement Areas (RAs). Von Blanckenburg (1992) also regards this as the central problem of land reform and refers to a conflict of objectives in Zimbabwe’s resettlement policy. He believes that more equal land distribution and improvements in agricultural production cannot be achieved simultaneously in the short to medium term because of the remarkable efficiency of large-scale farms and the relatively low efficiency of the settlers’ farms. This is because improved agricultural production is not only dependent upon what might be a better scale of farming operations. The conflict faced by the government in relation to its objectives is that, on the one hand, it has to fulfil its promises to redistribute land while, on the other, it is faced with ever-increasing internal and external requirements in terms of agricultural production. Von Blanckenburg observes that, in the inevitable process of setting economic policy priorities, the government has so far decided in favour of avoiding major loss of output and foreign currency earnings, and hence against more rapid redistribution of land.

The large-scale farmers continue to account for 82% of the arable crops produced for market and 94% of the animal produce. They also account for 86% of the export earnings from agricultural production. By using modern, intensive farming methods, yields per hectare achieved by large-scale farms are more than twice as high as those achieved by smallholders, even when natural production conditions are similar.

As suggested earlier, efforts were made to close this productivity gap by providing improved agricultural support, but the results have been disappointing. It is possible, particularly in the RAs, to identify a number of reasons for this, which at the same time should be regarded as problem areas that are intrinsic to the Program.

Selection of settlers: To date settlers have been selected virtually exclusively according to social and political criteria. However, the families selected (those having no or only small amounts of land, refugees, etc.) have not only lacked the required agricultural experience but also the necessary financial and material resources to apply intensive farming methods on their land. As a result subsistence farming has become more widespread in the Resettlement Areas because the majority of settlers have not been in a position to produce beyond that level. "Had better resourced and experienced farmers, with a greater capacity to bear the risk of innovation, been selected for resettlement, then current productivity levels would almost certainly have been higher." (World Bank Background Paper No.12 1991 produced for the Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Memorandum 1991). The government only decided to change the selection procedure and to give preferential consideration to experienced farmers and "master farmers" at the end of the Eighties. The future intention is only to resettle people who have been selected by the local authorities and whose selection is supported by the government extension service and the relevant agricultural organisations. At this point the conflict between those of the Resettlement Program’s objectives which are based upon social considerations and those based upon production economics becomes patently clear.

Support through agricultural policy: The intention was to change agricultural policy such that not only the farmers in the RAs, but all African smallholders would receive assistance both on production and on marketing their produce. However, putting this into practice proved a complex matter. The individual marketing boards, the Agriculture Finance Cooperation (AFC) and the Agricultural Technical and Extension Service (Agritex) had geared their activities totally to the needs of the LSCAs, as a result of which their structures now had to change. However, at a time when these bodies were experiencing their own difficulties in terms of their funding and organisation a change in focus, particularly towards the resettlement farms, was not a very attractive commercial proposition for any of the three organisations.

Nevertheless, in spite of various forms of opposition, smallholders were given access to the marketing organisations (GMP, CMB, DMB and CSC) and a system of fixed purchase prices was established. In order to strengthen the incentives to produce for the market purchase prices were also progressively raised until the end of the Eighties, but were later frozen again under pressure from international donors. However, marketing and pricing policy only had a minor impact in making farming systems more intensive because the problems chiefly stemmed from a lack of expertise and capital.

On the financing side, a deeper involvement was envisaged for the semi-state-controlled AFC. Its terms of reference were extended with the aim that it would now enhance the supply of credit to smallholders. To satisfy the settlers’ increased credit needs, particularly in the initial years, the AFC was to introduce a special credit programme, the Resettlement Credit Scheme (RCS), in 1982. Under the RCS the settlers were eligible to receive short and medium-term credits between the second and fourth year after their resettlement. It was assumed that after four years the settlers would be experienced and knowledgeable enough to receive credits under the second programme, the Small Farm Credit Scheme. The number and volume of loans provided to the settlers’ farms increased sharply at that time, but fell again at the end of the Eighties. Since then the volume of credit has remained at a relatively low level (cf. Appendix 2.2). In 1984 60% of the families resettled received a credit, compared with only 10% in 1990. The main impact of the initial credit boom was on the use of fertilisers, but it did not have a beneficial long-term effect on the sector as a whole. The World Bank was solemn in its judgement of the RCS - "The performance of the RCS is one of the most disappointing features of the resettlement programme" (World Bank Background Paper No.12 1991 produced for the Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Memorandum 1991). The reasons for the failure and the gradual withdrawal of the AFC from the RCS identified by the World Bank were poor repayment rates and the need for the AFC to consolidate its business. In January 1990 the non-repayment ratio from resettlement farms was about 77%. So far no attempt has been made to reestablish a special credit programme for the RAs.

It is very difficult for settlers to access the normal capital markets. Like farmers in the CAs they generally do not have any collateral to offer to lenders. As liens imposed upon land continue to be one of the most important types of collateral, this problem is of course closely related to the existing system of land tenure in the RAs. The permit system makes it impossible for the farmer to take out a mortgage on the land.

As in other subsectors Agritex is responsible for providing agricultural advice. The Agritex advisors normally live within the Resettlement Areas they serve. In the model-A Resettlement Areas, the most widespread model, one field adviser covers about 400 settler families. However, in reality the farmer-adviser ratio only averages 800:1. Apart from an insufficient supply of personnel, the extension service also suffers from poor logistical support, unspecific monitoring of the results achieved by advisers, too little use of demonstrative techniques and too little practical orientation in the training programmes. The "training and visit" approach recommended by the World Bank was terminated after a pilot study because it was considered to be too expensive, inflexible and incompatible with existing methods.

Land tenure: On top of the above problems of settler selection and policy support, a third problem area, that of land tenure, has been highlighted for some time in connection with the disappointing agricultural results in the RAs. The settlers have neither a formal long-term lease nor ownership title in respect of the land allocated to them. Land tenure in the RAs is based purely on a permit system administered by the Resettlement Officers of the Ministry of Local Government. The permit does not have a specific term and may be withdrawn at any time without compensation having to be paid for any investment the farmer has made. In principle, therefore, the purchase of land by the State to date under the Resettlement Program has been equivalent to nationalisation of what was previously private property.

Meanwhile extensive theoretical and empirical studies have been undertaken regarding the economic effects of land tenure systems. These show that the type of legal framework selected for the RAs can have an adverse economic impact. Even individual rights of use may, if they have insufficient institutional protection as in the case of arable land in the RAs, impede intensification of production and, with it, improvements in productivity. If rights of disposition are uncertain farmers and providers of credit will behave in an economically rational manner by deferring investment or reducing the amount of credit they will provide. Land markets which only exist in a rudimentary form also prevent further efficiency gains. In the case of the RAs, not even the semblance of a land market can develop because the land is owned by the State and long-term leases, which could be used to grant subleases, do not exist.

In the case of communal pasture rights the incentive for the individual to invest and to improve shared resources is even smaller, while the incentive to "free-ride" and to exploit the resources in question to the maximum is very great. Overgrazing and the overstocking of pasture land in the RAs provide confirmation of this.

The position relating to communal pasture is typical of the divergence between individual and communal rationality, which can only be controlled by recognised community institutions. In traditional societies chiefs, kraal heads and common values and norms ensured that communal rationality prevailed. In the artificially created Resettlement Schemes these institutions do not exist, which is why the Resettlement Officers were intended to perform this role. However, they often do not have the socio-cultural basis and authority, nor the necessary individual motivation, to pursue communal interests.

The problems faced by the Resettlement Program can be summarised as follows:

1. Problems in relation to the scale of the resettlement. The major factors which limited the scale of the resettlement were the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle and the limited availability of funding and administrative resources. The government’s politico-economic reservations and considerations also played a complementary role.
2. The RAs economic problems resulting from the social and political criteria applied in selecting resettlement candidates, inadequate support for agricultural policy and the unfavourable land tenure system.