Achim Blume (1996): Land Tenure in Rural Zimbabwe

2.2 Objectives and Implementation of the Resettlement Program

The literature on agricultural reform, which should also be taken to include the programme in Zimbabwe, draws a theoretical distinction between four objectives. Von Blanckenburg (1992), like Kuhnen (1982), identifies political, social and economic objectives, to which he adds a fourth: that of ensuring that agriculture is sustainable. Depending on the political intentions of governing powers, varying degrees of importance are attached to these specific components within the actual programme, ranging from none at all to a very high level.

As already outlined above, the motives behind Zimbabwean efforts to achieve reform are chiefly political, with social motives next in line. Following the numerous sacrifices demanded from the African population during the years of white supremacy, any political force which wanted to be certain of the voters’ support had to offer a programme incorporating a retransfer of economic goods and property to the black majority. In such a situation it makes sense to choose what is probably the most symbolic form of transfer, the redistribution of land, because land continues to be of particular traditional and spiritual importance to many Zimbabweans. Even during the struggle for independence both leading liberation groups exploited the popular demand for land redistribution for their own purposes. The fact that it fitted well into the political and ideological contexts of the opposition and future governing parties and also had plausible social-policy justifications was of course a bonus. Economic cost-benefit analyses played a comparatively minor role. On the contrary, substantial costs were expected which were to be offset by intended improvements in the pattern of farm sizes.

In the official description of the Resettlement Program its objectives were formulated in a very populistic manner, comprising several elements which could not be clearly defined, but which addressed the needs of the majority of the population at that time in a very skilful political way.

In summary the official objectives were to

• reduce population pressure in the CAs
• improve the agricultural output base
• raise the living standards of the largest sector of the population, the smallholders
• relieve the misery of the victims of the War of Independence
• make the distribution of land more just
• expand the infrastructure and the supply of services and
• safeguard national stability and economic progress.

These broad objectives probably in themselves placed too heavy demands on the Program and at the same time gave rise to unrealistic expectations. It would certainly have made more sense to establish more pragmatic, realistic objectives.

Government plans relating to the scale of the proposed resettlement were based on the recommendations of the Riddell Committee whose report had proposed that 220,000 families be resettled from the CAs in order to reduce population pressure. In the Transitional National Development Plan (1982), the government eventually announced that only 162,000 families would be resettled on 9 million hectares of land by 1985. However, disappointing experiences with resettlement programmes in other countries already indicated that even this reduced target would be difficult to achieve because of the high input of administrative, organisational and financial resources required.

Resettlement candidates were selected in the first instance on the basis of social and political criteria and in the end about 85% came from the CAs. The detailed criteria for resettlement candidates were that they should be

• effectively without land, unemployed, poor, married or widowed with dependants, between 18 and 55 years old and physically capable of using the land allocated to them productively on their own and to the full,
• or returned Zimbabwean refugees, that is, belonging to a group which had been given special status,
• or experienced in agriculture, and certificated as a master farmer.

There were essentially three organisational models proposed for the resettlement process. Model A involves an individual farming pattern, similar to the type predominating in the CAs, whereby each family receives five hectares of arable land and grazing rights on common pasture. Model B is built around the formation of cooperatives in which the majority of the production takes place on a communal basis. As a rule the members of the cooperative can only farm about 0.5 ha. privately. Model B farms have to be organised and managed on a cooperative basis. Model C provides for a similar form of resettlement to model A, but in connection with a centralised state or cooperative farm. The government regarded model C as an instrument to promote cooperative ideals by demonstrating the benefits of cooperative activity. There was also a fourth model (model D) which applied to resettlements within the CAs and did not change the farmers’ institutional pattern of land use.

The form of the planned land acquisition by the State and the legal form under which the land was to be used by the resettlers are the significant aspects in terms of land tenure.

The provisions governing the acquisition of land by the State until 1990 were already set down in the Lancaster House Agreement which encapsulated the outcome of the independence negotiations. The provisions were based upon the "willing-seller, willing-buyer" principle. The State could not simply expropriate the land, but had to purchase it from the large-scale farmers. The Constitution guaranteed that each vendor would not only receive prompt and appropriate compensation, but would also have the right to resort to a court if necessary, to determine the level of compensation. The government was also committed to transfer the compensation within a reasonable time period and, on request, to make the payment in foreign currency, to any specified country without tax being deducted. Owing to the strong desire of many white farmers to sell up and emigrate in the early years after Independence there was a sufficient supply of vendors. However, this proved to be just a one-off, short-term situation.

Important details of the legal principles relating to land acquisition were changed in 1985 as a bottleneck ^loomed for the rapid implementation of the Resettlement Program. Vendors of farms now had to offer the land to the government at a fixed price and had to grant the government preemption rights. The government was also permitted to pay the required market price in domestic currency. Nevertheless, the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle continued to apply. Thereafter the amount of land purchased increased slightly once more but this effect was also only temporary (cf. Appendix 2.1). By and large the planning and other uncertainty associated with the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle are a major disadvantage, even if this principle does help to reduce conflict with the large-scale farmers who play an important role in the economy.

In line with socialist ideals the majority of the ensuing resettlement was intended to be in accordance with model B, with the State continuing to own the land. However, model B did not find favour, given the tradition of individual forms of farming. 80% of the resettlements were de facto model A resettlements, where the State only granted rights of use to those resettled. "Each settler is granted three permits. One to depasture a certain number of livestock on a communal basis, one to cultivate an arable plot and one to reside on a specific residential plot. These permits are for no specific duration and there is currently no prospect of their being upgraded to leasehold or freehold status" (World Bank Background Paper No.12 produced for the Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Memorandum 1991). Informally a ten-year right of use is often granted, but ultimate control over the land remains with the State. The State even retains the right to terminate the permit without paying compensation for any improvements made to the land. Of course this has implications for planning certainty and, therefore, for investment patterns and the introduction of sustainable farming methods.

The Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) which was part of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development until 1985, is technically responsible for implementing the resettlement. However, following the reorganisation and the merger of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development with the Ministry of Agriculture to form the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the Department of Rural Development became part of the newly established Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development. DERUDE has only been part of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Development since 1991. Other organisations involved in the Resettlement Program are the state advisory service, Agritex, and the Department of Veterinary Services, both of which were part of the Ministry of Agriculture until 1985 and since the reorganisation have been part of the new joint ministry. However, the organisational problems associated with the Resettlement Program, partly due to the division of functions and responsibilities between two ministries at certain times, were not finally resolved by the reorganisation. Accordingly observers have a largely negative view of the status and powers of the decentralised departments, the Provincial Resettlement Offices.

Local administration in the individual Resettlement Schemes is the responsibility of the designated Resettlement Officers (ROs) representing central government. Their responsibilities include the allocation, registration and monitoring of the land permits. Those resettled do not have their own elected representatives at local government level, but the ROs are required to help the settlers to set up and run development committees (Village and Ward Development Committees, VIDCOs and WADCOs respectively).

From the beginning the financing of the Resettlement Program was a critical element of the overall concept, particularly because the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle made long-term planning of land acquisition costs impossible. In addition substantial local infrastructure and personnel costs were forecast. Without the support of external donors it would probably have been impossible to implement the Program. In the Eighties the most important donors, the United Kingdom, the EC (as it then was), Kuwait and the African Development Bank funded about half the total costs. A major funding bottleneck resulted from a requirement by the foreign donors that the Zimbabwean government should prefund the resettlement projects and then apply for reimbursement later. The EC, in particular, largely helped to overcome these financing problems by agreeing to make a prepayment.